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With the burgeoning of the elderly population nationwide and in
California in particular, problems peculiar to the elderly demand in-
creased attention and resources from both the political process and
the public. Elder abuse, undoubtedly, is one of these problems. It is
estimated that five percent of the elder population or more than 1.5
million elders nationwide may be abused each year.' In California there
were approximately 12,000 reports of elder abuse during 1986-1987,
an almost forty-five percent increase in the number of reports from
the previous year.2 The number of vulnerable elderly in California also
continues to grow at an accelerated pace. In 1985 there were 2.8 mil-
lion Californians age sixty-five or older, and by the year 2000 this
number is projected to reach 3.8 million.3 Since 1983, when California
passed its first piece of legislation directly addressing the problem of
elder abuse, the state's elder abuse laws have remained largely un-
changed. Despite California's reputation as a state that spearheads
legal reform and irrespective of the extraordinary growth of the elderly
population in California, other states have taken the lead in enacting
more detailed and carefully drafted statutes that more thoughtfully
address the delicate problems involved in balancing the needs and rights
of the abused elderly with the interests of states in protecting their
citizens. This Note critically examines California's response to the
problem of elder abuse in domestic or noninstitutional settings. The
Note reviews other states' legislative responses to the problem, com-
pares California Adult Protective Services legislation with the general
provisions found in these statutes, and concludes that California's
present system is in need of change.
* Member Third Year class; B.A. 1986, University of Rochester.
1. Elder Abuse: A Decade of Shame and Inaction, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Health and Long-Term Care of the House Select Comm. on Aging, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1990) [hereinafter Elder Abuse House Hearings].
2. Dresslar, Programs to Treat, Prosecute "Elder Abuse" Criticized, L.A. Daily J., Nov.
8, 1988, at 1.
3. Protecting the Silent Population: Remedying Elder and Dependent Adult Abuse,
RECOMMENDATONS OF nm CouNwr WmELtAE Assoc., I (Mar. 1988) [hereinafter Silent Popu-
lation].
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The Note first outlines the contours of the problem of elder abuse
including its background and causes, as well as the more commonly
encountered types of abuse. It then briefly explains what adult pro-
tective services are, outlines their role in the context of the elder abuse
problem, and explores elder abuse-related adult protective services leg-
islation nationwide. The Note then reviews the problem of elder abuse
in California. It surveys the scope of California's elder abuse problem
and assesses the state's responses to the problem, including past stat-
utory schemes, unsuccessful amendments to those schemes, and re-
cently proposed amendments. The review ends with a discussion of
California's present Adult Protective Services laws. Finally, the Note
evaluates California's present Adult Protective Services scheme in light
of other states' responses and proposes amendments to the existing
law that would improve the law by better addressing the problem and
the balance that must be struck between state interests and protection
of individual rights.
I. Elder Abuse: Its History and Scope
Understanding the history and scope of the elder abuse problem
is important to appreciate fully its urgency. Since the scope of the
problem is directly affected by the number of elderly Americans, this
Part begins with a broad look at the "greying" of the American, and
particularly the Californian, public. The focus then shifts to a dis-
cussion of the unearthing of elder abuse as a national problem and
an explanation of its nature.
A. Growth of the Elderly Population
By 1980 more than twenty-five million Americans were age sixty-
five years or older4 and 2.9 million were older than eighty. 5 In 1990
almost thirteen percent of the population of the United States, over
31 million Americans, were over the age of sixty-five6 and by the year
4. Comment, A Response to the Problem of Elder Abuse: Florida's Revised Adult
Protective Services Act, 14 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 745, 746-47 (1986) (authored by Christine
Metcalf).
5. CONSERVATORSHIP OF THE ELDERLY: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ITS INTERFACE WITH PRO-
GRAS AND SERVICES FOR OLDER CALIFORNIANS (Report to the Senate Subcommittee on Aging,
prepared for the Senate Office of Research by Marquart Policy Analysis Assoc.) at 1 (1988)
[hereinafter CONSERVATORSHIP RECOMMENDATIONS].
6. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1990, at 16 (110th ed. 1990) [hereinafter 1990 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT] (table
no. 18, "Projections of the Total Population by Age, Sex, and Race: 1989 to 2010").
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2000 that number is expected to reach approximately thirty-five mil-
lion, thirteen percent of the total population.
7
Compared to the national figures, an even more dramatic increase
in the elderly population has occurred in California over the past two
decades, and the rate of increase is expected to accelerate. Between
1985 and 1990, the age group from sixty-five to seventy-four increased
by sixteen percent and the age group of seventy-five years and older
increased by nineteen percent. 8 Furthermore, between 1980 and 2000
the eighty and older age group is projected to increase by ninety-four
percent and the eighty-five and older group is projected to increase
by 138%.9 Today, ten percent of the nation's elderly population re-
sides in California. 0 The future growth of California's elderly pop-
ulation is expected to be greater than that nationwide because,
compared with the national average, California has fewer citizens un-
der the age of eighteen and more individuals between the ages of eight-
een and forty-four." Assuming members of the younger generations
remain in California as they age, this imbalance will contribute further
to the growth of the state's elderly population. As a result of these
peculiarly Californian trends, the problems affecting the elderly will
become more acute in California, sooner and with greater intensity,
than in the U.S. at large.
12
B. The Discovery, Prevalence, and Causes of Elder Abuse
Following the "discovery" of child abuse and neglect in the 1960s"3
and spousal abuse in the 1970s,14 elder abuse crept into the American
7. Id. The population over 85 years old, which was approximately 2.2 million in 1980,
is estimated to grow to approximately 4.6 million by 2000. Id. at 37 (table no. 41, "Population
65 Years Old and Over, By Age Group and Sex, 1960 to 1988, and Projections, 1990 and
2000").
8. CONSERVATORsHJP RECOMmENDATIONS, supra note 5, at 1.
9. Id.
10. Elder Abuse House Hearings, supra note 1, at 4 (statement of Edward R. Roybal,
Chairman, Subcomm. on Health and Long-Term Care).
11. CoMssION ON CALIFORNIA STATE GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION AND ECONOMY, TIM
LrrrLE HoovER CoMmsioN's REPoRT ON CosTy REsiaMENTI. CARE FOR TM ELDU.Y 8
(1989) [hereinafter Lnrra Hoov-R ComiossioN's REPORT].
12. CoNsEnvAToasmiP RECo NDATIoNs, supra note 5, at 2; LITTLE HoovEa ComassioN's
REPORT, supra note 11, at 7-8. Over the decade from 1979 to 1989, the California general
population was projected to have grown more than 20%, the 65 or older population was to
have increased by 45%, and the 85 or older population was to have increased by approximately
68%. CONSERVATORSHIP REcoMMENDATioNs, supra note 5, at 55.
13. See Katz, Elder Abuse, 18 J. F.As. L. 695, 704 (1979-1980).
14. See generally SousE ABusE: A SEcTED BIBoAPx'HY (1978) (compiled by C.
Johnson, J. Ferry & M. Kravitz) (collection of works written in the 1970s that discuss and
explore the problem of spousal abuse and the role of government in addressing the problem).
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conscience in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The British took note
of the problem of elder abuse as early as 1975 and a British doctor
christened it "granny bashing."' 15 By the late 1970s numerous Amer-
ican studies began to surface which indicated that elder abuse is a
serious national problem in the United States as well.
16
In 1981 one of these initial studies, a report published by the House
of Representatives Select Committee on Aging, offered the first in-
tensive national investigation of the problem of elder abuse. 7 The re-
port concluded that elder abuse, although a "hidden problem," is a
national scourge and recommended that states enact laws to address
the problem. 8 The report determined that four percent of the Amer-
ican elderly population, roughly one million of the nation's elderly,
may be victims of moderate to severe abuse. 19 The Committee found
that physical abuse, including negligence, is the most common type
of abuse, followed by financial abuse, abusive abrogation of basic
constitutional rights, and finally psychological abuse. 20 Notably, dif-
fering types of abuse often were reported simultaneously in a given
case.2' The study also concluded that elder abuse, although propor-
15. Burston, Granny-Battering Letter, 1975 BRIT. MED. J. 592; see also J. RENVoIZE,
WEB OF VIOLENCE: A STUDY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 113-27 (1978).
16. See, e.g., HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING, 97Tm CONG., lsT SESS., ELDER ABUSE: AN
EXAMINATION OF A HIDDEN PROBLEM, (Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter ELDER ABUSE HOUSE
REPORT]; THE BATTERED ELDER SYNDROME: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY (M. Block & J. Sinnott
ed. 1979) [hereinafter Block & Sinnott]; Lau & Kosberg, Abuse of the Elderly by Informal
Care Providers, AGING, Sept.-Oct. 1979, at 10; LEGAL RESEARCH AND SERVICES FOR THE
ELDERLY, ELDER ABUSE IN MASSACHUSETTS: A SURVEY OF PROFESSIONALS AND PARAPROFES-
SIONALS (1979) (prepared by H. O'Malley, H. Segars, R. Perez, V. Mitchell & G. Kneupfel).
These early studies generally found that the "typical" abused elder was a widow over 75
years old who lived with an adult child upon whom she was significantly dependent, who was
significantly mentally or physically impaired, and who had little financial independence. See,
e.g., Block & Sinnott, supra, at 75-76; Lau & Kosberg, supra, at 11-12. The studies conducted
during those years also noted that the abuser often was one of the elder's children. Block &
Sinnott, supra, at 77; Lau & Kosberg, supra, at 12. More recent studies of the problem
contradict these findings at least in some respects. See, e.g., Pillemer & Finkelhor, The
Prevalence of Elder Abuse: A Random Sample Survey, 28 THE GERONTOLOGIST 51, 51-57
(1988) (noting, for example, that their research found half the victims of elder abuse were
men and that spouses perpetrate at least half of the abuse).
17. ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at xiv.
18. Id. at xiii-xiv.
19. Id. at xiv-xv.
20. Id. at xv. The Committee report contained its own specific definitions of what
constitutes abuse within each of these categories. Id. at 3, 7-8, 13-14, 24, 26-30, 30-34. The
types of behavior that are included within the meaning of "abuse" or "neglect" vary from
state to state. See infra notes 63-81 and accompanying text (discussing various types and
definitions of abuse and neglect as they appear in state adult protective services laws).
21. ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at xv.
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tionally as prevalent as child abuse, is far less likely to be reported.22
A 1986 comprehensive nationwide study conducted by the American
Public Welfare Association in cooperation with the National Asso-
ciation of State Units on Aging confirmed that the total number of
reports of suspected or alleged abuse or neglect has increased signif-
icantly since the release of the 1981 House Report.2 The 1986 study
indicated that twenty-six of the thirty states surveyed showed an in-
crease in elder abuse reports. 24
More than a decade after the 1981 House Report, the House of
Representatives Select Committee on Aging's Subcommittee on Health
and Long-Term Care released the most recent congressional assess-
ment of the nation's elder abuse problem. The title of the Subcom-
mittee's hearing and report, "Elder Abuse: A Decade of Shame and
Inaction, '"21 aptly summarizes not only the Subcommittee's findings
but also the nation's response to the problem of elder abuse since the
first House of Representatives hearings on the problem were held in
1978 and the first report was issued in 1981. This recent congressional
inquiry was conducted to review the current knowledge regarding the
problem and its prevalence, as well as to assess the adequacy of state
and federal responses to elder abuse.?
The Subcommittee concluded that the incidence of elder abuse is
increasing nationally and that five percent or more than 1.5 million
elderly persons may be abused yearly.27 This figure represents a one
percent or 500,000-case increase over that reported in the 1981 House
Report.? The Subcommittee found that elder abuse is far less likely
to be reported than is child abuse. It determined that only one of every
eight cases of elder abuse, as compared with one of every three cases
of child abuse, is reported; 29 this figure represents a decrease from the
1981 House Report estimate that one in five cases of elder abuse is
reported.30 Like the 1981 House Report, the 1990 Subcommittee Re-
port also surveyed the types of abuse, profiled the victims and abusers,
22. Id. at xiv.
23. ELDm ABusE PROJECT, AMERicAN PuBUc WELARE ASS'N (APWA), NAT'L ASS'N OF
STATE UNITS ON AGING (NASUA), A COMPREBNSIvE ANALYSIS OF STATE POLICy AND PRACTicE
RELATED TO ELDER ABUSE vii-viii (1986) [hereinafter AMmUCAN PuBUc WELFARE REPORT].
24. Id. at viii.
25. Elder Abuse House Hearings, supra note 1.
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gathered data regarding reporting of abuse, and attempted to deter-
mine the causes of elder abuse.3
The Subcommittee Report further noted that forty-three states
have enacted statutes or adult protective services laws that provide for
mandatory reporting of elder abuse; this number represents a sub-
stantial increase over the sixteen states with such legislation in 1981.32
The Subcommittee added, however, that state implementation and en-
forcement of these laws have been hampered by a lack of correlative
legislation providing financial support for these purposes.33 The find-
ings generally pointed to the gaping discrepancy between the money
allocated to adult protective services and child abuse services; for ex-
ample, in 1989, on average nationwide, services for victims of child
abuse received $45.03 per child resident, as compared to a paltry $3.80
allocated to protective services for the elderly per elderly resident.
34
The Subcommittee stressed that without additional federal funding the
states will remain unable to begin effectively to ameliorate the elder
abuse problem. Actually, since 1980 the major source of federal fund-
ing for state adult protective services programs, the Social Services
Block Grant, has been cut directly or reduced because of inflation by
almost one-third.
35
The Subcommittee Report concluded by offering a number of
policy options for Congress and the states to consider. The Subcom-
mittee advocated a coordinated national effort whereby the federal
government would assist states by providing them federal funds. This
plan would include the passage of the "Prevention, Identification, and
Treatment of Elder Abuse Act of 1989. ' ' 36 The Act would create a
national center on elder abuse, which among other functions would:
disseminate annual summaries of recent research regarding elder abuse;
maintain an information clearinghouse on programs for prevention,
identification, and treatment of elder abuse; and compile, publish, and
disseminate training materials for personnel working in elder abuse
31. Id. at 96-97.
32. Id. at 96; see infra notes 82-137 and accompanying text (discussing mandatory reporting
laws); cf. AMmiEsuc PUBLiC WELFARE REPORT, supra note 23, at vi (in addition, most states
reported that they have regulations in place to implement their state legislation on elder abuse).
33. Elder Abuse House Hearings, supra note 1, at 96.
34. Id. The Subcommittee added that the 62% increase from the 1980 allocation was due
only to inflation. Id.; see infra notes 117-127 and accompanying text (discussing the discrepancy
between funding Adult Protective Services and Child Protective Services in the nation and
particularly in California).
35. Elder Abuse House Hearings, supra note 1, at 96; see also infra note 125 (further
discussing the causes and implications of federal funding cuts).
36. H.R. 220, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) [hereinafter H.R. 220], reprinted in Elder
Abuse House Hearings, supra note 1, at 7.
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prevention, identification, and treatment.17 Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, the Act would provide federal matching funds to states
with existing elder abuse programs and distribute new funds to states
that meet certain enumerated conditions."'
Although an in-depth discussion of the causes of elder abuse is
beyond the scope of this Note, a brief review of some of the numerous
theories advanced to explain the incidence of abuse helps one un-
derstand its prevalence in our society today. 9 The economic, physical,
and emotional stress suffered by those living with a dependent elderly
individual often has been cited as a major contributor.4 According
to the 1981 House of Representatives Report on Elder Abuse, "[m]ost
experts do appear to believe ... that a major precipitating factor [of
elder abuse] is family stress. Meeting the daily needs of a frail, de-
pendent elderly relative may be an intolerable burden for family mem-
bers.",
41
Although it is clear that incidences of elder abuse are not limited
to lower economic classes or certain ethnic or racial groups, lack of
financial resources often is a factor which provokes stress that can lead
to abusive behavior. For a family with a fixed income and strict budget,
the additional financial burden of providing daily care for an ailing
or disabled elderly parent with increasing medical costs can become
overwhelming, precipitating physical abuse and neglect. 42
Similarly, the poor timing of the added responsibility of caring
for an ailing elder often is a factor. The elderly parent's need for care
often becomes acute when the adult child is nearing retirement and
looking forward to relaxation, or as one author notes, during the
37. Id. §§ 2(b)(l)-(3).
38. Id. § 4.
39. For a discussion of the causes of elder abuse, see generally Galbraith, Elder Abuse:
An Overview, in ELDER ABUSE: PERsPEcTrvEs ox AN EMEaoiNG CRisIs 15-22 (1986); Kosberg,
Preventing Elder Abuse: Identification of High Risk Factors Prior to Placement Decisions, 28
THm GERoNToLOGIST 43 (1988); Suitor & Pillemer, Explaining Intergenerational Conflict When
Adult Children and Elderly Parents Live Together, 50 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1037 (1988).
40. Steinmetz, Battered Parents, Socm'r, July-Aug. 1978, at 54-55.
41. ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 59; see also Katz, supra note 13, at
703; Lau & Kosberg, supra note 16, at 13. The 1990 House Subcommittee Report recommended
passage of H.R. 2263, "The Long-Term Care Act," which would, among other things, provide
long-term care services in the home to the chronically ill and thereby provide assistance and
relief to those who care for dependent and chronically ill elderly. Elder Abuse House Hearings,
supra note 1, at 99.
42. ELDER ABUSE HousE REPORT, supra note 16, at 61-62; Block & Sinnott, supra note
16, at 53; Katz, supra note 13, at 701; Lau & Kosberg, supra note 16, at 13. Stress engendered
by the high cost of living and other economic realities is exacerbated by the fact that women,
who often traditionally have been and currently are the primary care providers for elderly in
homes, increasingly are now members of the work force; they have even less time and patience
to negotiate the special needs of an elderly individual. Block & Sinnott, supra note 16, at 53.
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"launching stages" for the adult child's own children or family when
the adult child has the added financial responsibilities of a child's col-
lege or wedding expenses.
43
Other noted contributors to the incidence of abuse include in-
creased life expectancy, 44 retaliation or patterns of family violence,
45
ageism, 46 lack of community resources, 47 alcohol use, drug use, mental
43. Steinmetz, supra note 40, at 54; cf. ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at
63 (adult children resent the intrusion of dependent parents when the child may himself be in
his SOs or 60s and have his own medical problems and less strength to handle the elder's
increased demands); Block & Sinnott, supra note 16, at 53 (noting that increasing numbers of
adult daughters work outside the home and thus have less time for care-giving); Katz, supra
note 13, at 701-02 (in some cases, a long-term unhappy relationship between parent and child
can compound the difficulty of providing care for an elderly parent); Lau & Kosberg, supra
note 16, at 13 (as the life span increases, caregivers themselves more often are elderly).
44. Increased life expectancy means the time period during which an elder is dependent
on domestic caretakers for assistance is extended. See ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 16, at 63. According to one study, "It may be that the increasing presence of the elderly
and their rolelessness is a likely contributor to their own vulnerability. It is now likely that in
old age, people will be dependent upon their children or grandchildren longer than their
children were dependent upon them." Id. at 64 (quoting R. Douglas, T. Hickey & C. Neil,
A Study of Maltreatment of the Elderly and Other Vulnerable Adults, Univ. of Mich., Institute
of Gerontology (1980)).
The increased life expectancy that is relevant here is not life expectancy as measured at
birth. Rather, the pertinent figure is the number of years that today's elder would be expected
to survive. Life expectancies as measured in this manner have risen significantly over the past
20 to 30 years. See Longino, Soldo, & Manton, Demography of Aging in the United States,
in GERONTOLOGY: PERSPECTIVs AND ISSUES 19 (K. Ferraro ed. 1990) (noting, for example,
that the average life expectancy for individuals age 65 rose from 13.9 years in 1965, to 16.1
in 1970, and 16.9 years in 1985).
45. This explanation characterizes elder abuse as part of a cycle of family violence: a
pattern, consistent with other types of family violence, in which the abuser has suffered real
or perceived mistreatment by his parents or caregivers earlier in life and who now reverses the
behavior. Lau & Kosberg, supra note 16, at 13; see also ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 16, at 59-60 (children who were abused by a parent have a one in two chance of later
abusing their parents).
46. "Ageism" is the bias and prejudice society harbors against the elderly. It includes the
widespread negative perceptions of and attitudes toward older persons and their role in society.
Ageism is most prevalent in industrial urbanized societies that exclude the elderly from
participating in and contributing to society. Block & Sinnott, supra note 16, at 57-58; see
ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 60; Katz, supra note 13, at 703-04. According
to a Harris poll report,
the image of older people held by the public at large is a distorted one tending to
be negative and possibly damaging. The media, with coverage of the elderly poor,
the elderly sick, the elderly institutionalized and the elderly unemployed or retired,
may be protecting and reinforcing stereotypes of elderly and myths of old age.
Galbraith, supra note 39, at 21 (citation omitted).
47. Support systems for in-home care providers are inadequate to relieve some of the
pressures on families providing care for the elderly. Block and Sinnott note that a range of
resources could be offered to the caretaker and elder that would relieve some of the stress
engendered by the dynamics of the situation. Possible resources include home-related services
such as nursing care and home-aides; meal delivery; day care and respite services; transportation
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illness, and other characteristics that leave care providers unable to
make appropriate judgments and perceptions.4s
H. The States' Responses to Elder Abuse
Between 1973 and January 1981, prior to publication of the House
of Representatives first report on elder abuse, only sixteen states en-
acted legislation focusing on the problem of abuse of adults, and these
laws addressed the problem of abuse of all adults eighteen and older;
until 1979 none was specific to elders.49 By 1980, immediately before
the first House Report, only five states had passed statutes specifically
aimed at protecting elders. By 1985-and no doubt as a result of the
congressional attention and national publicity that the problem finally
received in the early 1980s-that number mushroomed to forty-four.
50
Today fifty states, including California, have enacted some type of
legislation that addresses the problem of elder abuse.
5
1
A. A Starting Point: What Are Adult Protective Services?
Adult protective services (APS) traditionally are defined as "a
system of preventive, supportive, and surrogate services for the elderly
living in the community to enable them to maintain independent living
and avoid abuse and exploitation. ' ' 52 An adult protective services law
is a statute that establishes an APS system. Most states include elder
abuse provisions in their already existing adult protective services leg-
islation.5
3
services; counseling and other mental health services; and educational programs regarding care
of the elderly. See Block & Sinnott, supra note 16, at 93.
48. Lau & Kosberg, supra note 16, at 13. The authors note that these non-normal
caregivers may include schizophrenic, retarded, or alcoholic children as well as those who are
elderly and senile themselves and not aware of their behavior and its effects. Id.; see also
ELDER ABusE HousE REPoRT, supra note 16, at 64-65; Katz, supra note 13, at 702; Pillemer
& Finkelhor, Causes of Elder Abuse: Caregiver Stress Versus Problem Relatives, 59 Am. J.
ORTHOPSYCmHATRY 179, 185-86 (1989). But see Pedrick-Cornell & Gelles, Elder Abuse: The
Status of Current Knowledge, 31 FAm. REL. 457, 462-63 (1982) (arguing that this theory has
not been supported by research).
49. Miller & Dodder, The Abused: Abuser Dyad: Elder Abuse in the State of Florida, in
ELaE ABusE PRACnCE AN PoLicy 166-67 (R. Filinson & S. Ingman ed. 1989).
1 50. Id. The rapid proliferation of state elder abuse legislation after the 1981 House Report
is worth noting as it illustrates the nation's ability to respond to an urgent national problem
when it is called upon to do so. One can only hope that the latest House Report noting the
growth of the problem since 1981 will have the same motivating effect.
51. This figure includes the District of Columbia and Guam as "states." Only Puerto
Rico has no laws addressing elder abuse. AlsucAN Puniuc WELFARE REPORT, supra note 23,
at vi.
52. Regan, Intervention Through Adult Protective Services Programs, 18 THE GERoNToL-
OGIST 250, 251 (1978).
53. As of 1986, 15 states had legislation that specifically addressed the problem of elder
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Although the content of APS laws varies from state to state, each
adult protective services system typically includes two main compo-
nents: coordinated provision of services for adults determined to be
at risk of abuse, and the actual or potential power (of the state or
a local governmental entity) to intervene legally in an individual's life
and make decisions for him.54 This power usually is invoked when an
elder is deemed incapable of making decisions for himself, is per-
sonally in danger, or is dangerous to others. In some states the power
includes the ability to intervene when an elder refuses services or is
deemed incapable of consenting."
In addition to these general categories, elder abuse APS statutes
ordinarily contain any combination of more specific sections including
but not limited to who is covered by the statute (i.e., elders only or
elders and dependent adults); provisions for mandatory reporting of
abuse; guidelines for investigation of abuse; provisions regarding in-
voluntary as well as emergency intervention; and definitions of abuse,
neglect, and exploitation.
A number of states' laws exclusively address the problem of elder
abuse . 6 Other states not only have these exclusive statutes but also
have other laws that cover elder abuse.57 In conjunction with existing
elder-abuse-specific or adult protective services laws, some states also
use domestic violence statutes to protect elderly from abuse 58 and yet
abuse. Id.; see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.24.010-.100 (1990) (Protection of the Elderly); IDAHO
CODE §§ 39-5301 to -5312 (1985 & Supp. 1990) (Elderly Abuse, Exploitation, Neglect and
Abandonment Reporting Act); MONT. CODE Am. §§ 53-5-501 to -525 (1989) (Montana Elder
Abuse Prevention Act). For ease of reference, this Note will use the term "APS law" to
denote APS laws that relate either exclusively or partly to elder abuse.
54. Regan, supra note 52, at 251; see also SENATE SPECIAL Comm. ON AGING, 95TH CO NG.,
IST SESS., PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR THE ELDERLY: A WORKING PAPER 3-4 (Comm. Print 1977)
[hereinafter WORKING PAPER].
55. WORKING PAPER, supra note 54, at 18-19; see infra notes 208-240 and accompanying
text.
56. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.24.010-.100 (1984); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 200.5091-
.5099 (Michie 1986).
57. In Illinois, for example, both the Illinois Elder Abuse and Neglect Act and the
Domestic Violence Act of 1986 serve the needs of abused elderly. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 23, para. 6601-12 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989) (Illinois Elder Abuse and Neglect Act); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 40, paras. 2311-2 to 2313-5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990) (Illinois Domestic
Violence Act of 1986).
58. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 53-701 to -706, 99-5201 to -5203 (Harrison Supp. 1989)
(Georgia Domestic Violence Act); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, paras. 2311-2 to 2313-5 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1990) (Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§
761-771 (1981 & Supp. 1989) (Maine Domestic Violence Act). Although an exhaustive discussion
of California's domestic violence laws is beyond the scope of this Note, a brief discussion of
the availability of this avenue of relief is important. In California, the Domestic Violence
Prevention Act provides elders with a supplemental remedy to that found in the California
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others have provisions in their penal codes that provide for criminal
prosecution of elder abusers. 59 States' definitions of those protected
under APS laws also vary. Some provide protection for all adults over
eighteen who are impaired, incapacitated, or otherwise disabled. 60 Other
statutes refer only to "elderly" individuals, with "elderly" typically
APS laws. See CAL. Civ. PRoC. CODE §§ 540-553 (West 1990). Under the Act, an elder may
obtain a restraining order with or without notice to an alleged abuser upon an affidavit that
shows reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse. Id. § 545. The Act provides that such
an order may be granted to "any family or household member who prior to or at the time
such order is granted, was actually residing with the person or persons [to] whom such order
is directed." Id. A family or household member includes, among others, "a spouse, former
spouse, parent, child .... or any other person who regularly resides in the household" or did
so within the past six months. Id. § 542(c).
According to one source, "The restraining order is probably the most important civil tool
we have for protecting the abused elderly ... It can be used not only in instances where
abuse has already occurred, but when there have been threats or attempts of physical abuse."
Elder Abuse Awareness, April 1988, at 1 (newsletter of the San Francisco Institute on Aging
at Mount Zion Hospital and Medical Center, coordinating agency to San Francisco's Consor-
tium for Elder Abuse Prevention) (Mary Anne Morgan ed.) [hereinafter ElderAbuseAwareness]
(statements of Nancy Rasch-Chabot, San Francisco attorney specializing in elder law). Obtaining
a restraining order is a relatively simple task and offers a quick means of ameliorating
potentially dangerous circumstances. See generally id. at 2-4 (discussing the application for
and issuance of restraining orders in the context of elder abuse).
An in depth discussion of the use of domestic violence laws as tools for dealing with the
elder abuse problem is beyond the scope of this Note, which focuses on the function of adult
protective services in negotiating the problem of domestic or noninstitutional elder abuse.
59. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 368 (West 1988) (imposing criminal penalties on both
elder caregivers and individual noncaregivers). California Penal Code § 368(a) punishes any
individual who: "under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or
death, willfully causes or permits any elder ... with knowledge that he ... is an elder ...
to suffer, or inflicts thereon. unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or ... willfully
causes or permits the person or health of the elder ... to be injured, or willfully causes or
permits ... [him] to be placed in a situation such that his ... person or health is endan-
gered.... ." Id. These offenses are punishable by a maximum of one year imprisonment in
county jail or two to four years in state prison. Id.
In addition to criminal penalties for a felony conviction of actual infliction of physical pain"
or mental suffering, under § 368 it is a misdemeanor to permit an elder to remain in a
situation in which he "may be endangered." Id. § 368(b).
Finally, the section provides that a caretaker of an elder who violates any provision of law
proscribing theft or embezzlement with respect to an elder's property is subject to imprisonment
and fines. Id. § 368(c). The provisions in § 368 are similar to some penal-like provisions that
appear within other states' APS laws. See infra notes 165-173 and accompanying text. For
additional information regarding prosecution of alleged elder abuse offenders under Penal
Code § 368, see Elder Abuse Awareness, supra note 58, at 5-7; Leonard, Prosecuting Crimes
Against Elders: A Guide for California Prosecutors, PRoscuTroR's BRE, Spring 1989, at 8-
9; cf. Heiseler, Working With Community Agencies to Successfully Prosecute Elder Abuse
Cases, PROSECUTOR'S BRI'F, Spring 1989, at 5-6 (discussing the prosecutor's need to work with
community groups, including public agencies and private organizations, to prosecute abuse
cases successfully).
60. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-28-101(1) (Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.557(2)(b)
(West Supp. 1990); MIss. CODE ANN. § 43-47-5(m) (Supp. 1990).
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defined either as sixty years and older6' or sixty-five years and older.
62
B. Adult Protective Services Statutes
A background on the substance of APS laws in other states is
crucial to a critical examination of California's APS response to elder
abuse. The following sections discuss the general provisions found in
state APS statutes that are applied in the context of elder abuse.
(1) Definitions of Abuse, Neglect, and Exploitation
The definitions of what constitutes elder abuse vary widely. Typ-
ically the broad categories include physical, psychological, fiduciary,
and sexual abuse or exploitation as well as neglect; 63 the definitions
of each type of abuse vary within these respective categories.
All states that have APS legislation include physical harm in their
definitions of abuse. States may distinguish, however, between in-
stances of willful infliction of physical abuse and negligent infliction
or failure to prevent the physical abuse. 64 A more limited number of
states consider infliction of mental anguish or psychological injury a
form of abuse.65 Among those that do, some definitions only include
those cases that require medical attention; others do not specify such
a requirement. 6 As one commentator noted, psychological abuse is
common and its omission in many state statutes is unfortunate. 67 He
61. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, para. 6602(e) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 19A, § 14 (West Supp. 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 660.250 (Vernon 1988).
62. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.24.100(6) (1990); TEx. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 48.002(1)
(Vernon 1990).
63. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 39-5302 (1985) (abandonment, abuse, exploitation, mental
injury, and neglect defined); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3472 (Supp. 1989) (abuse, neglect,
exploitation, and sexual exploitation defined); ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at
I (physical, sexual, psychological or financial abuse of the elderly or otherwise causing the
deprivation of their human rights by their relatives or caretakers). But see ALASKA STAT. §
47.24.100 (1990) (no definition of exploitation); IOWA CODE ANN. § 235B.1 (West Supp. 1990)
(neglect not included in definition).
64. See, e.g., ARc. STAT. ANN. § 5-28-101(2) (Supp. 1989) (willful or negligent acts);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 235B.1(1) (West Supp. 1990) (willful or negligent acts or omissions resulting
in physical injury); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-47-5(a) (Supp. 1990) (willful infliction of physical
pain or injury).
65. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.24.100(2) (1990); MICH. Comnp. LAWS ANN. § 400.11(a)
(West 1988); MINN. STAT. Am. § 626.557(2)(d)(2) (West Supp. 1990).
66. Compare ALASKA STAT. § 47.24.100(2) (1990) (requires medical attention) with MICH.
Comp. LAWS ANN. § 400.11(a) (West 1988) (no medical attention required) and MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 626.557(2)(d)(2) (West Supp. 1990) (same).
67. Traxler, Elder Abuse Laws: A Survey of State Statutes, in ELDER ABUSE: PERsPEcTrvEs
IN AN EMERGING CRISIS 139, 152 (1986).
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notes, however, that failure to include psychological abuse may be
attributed to a number of factors. These include problems in defining
the term, investigating the abuse, and providing the necessary services,
as well as the difficulty of taking into consideration differing indi-
vidual levels of tolerance for psychological abuse.6 A few states rec-
ognize unreasonable confinement as a form of potential elder abuse; 69
even fewer define abuse as including intimidation.70 A number of states
also include sexual abuse either within the general abuse definition or
consider it as a separate category of abusive behavior.
71
Almost all states include neglect in their APS laws. Neglect typ-
ically is defined as the failure to provide or deprivation of basic needs
such as clothing, food, shelter, supervision, and care for physical and
mental health.72 Some states merely have a negligence level of cul-
pability for actionable neglect; 73 others require willfulness.7 4 Eleven
states consider self-neglect75 as a variety of neglect that may warrant
protection and either designate it as a separate category of neglect or
include it within the general definition of neglect.
7 6
Exploitation also is a common element in these provisions. It usu-
ally is defined as the illegal or improper use of a vulnerable or in-
68. Id. But see Katz, supra note 13, at 715. As with reporting psychological abuse in the
context of child abuse, there are "immense social and constitutional questions" involved in
creating a system of mandated reporting of emotional injury or neglect of elders. Moreover,
in the case of an elderly person it may be "more difficult to determine whether symptoms of
emotional damage are organic, functional or situational in origin." Id. (citation omitted).
69. See, e.g., ME. Rnv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3472(1) (Supp. 1989); Miss. CODE ANN. §
43-47-5(a) (Supp. 1990).
70. See, e.g., Tnx. Hum. Rrs. CODE ANN. § 48.002(2) (Vernon 1990).
71. See, e.g., HAw. REv. STAT. § 349C-1 (1985 & Supp. 1989) (sexual abuse not specifically
defined but included in general definition of abuse); InL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, para. 6602 § 2(a)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989) (same); see also ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3472.15 (Supp.
1990) (separate definition of sexual abuses or exploitation as "contact or interaction of a
sexual nature involving an incapacitated or dependent adult without that adult's consent.").
72. See, e.g., ME. Rnv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3472(11) (Supp. 1989); MicH. Comp. LAWS
ANm. § 400.11(e) (West 1988).
73. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. Am. § 415.102(13) (West Supp. 1990) (using a "reasonably
prudent person" standard); IDAHO CODE § 39-5302(8) (1985) (same).
74. See, e.g., MD. FAm. LAW CODE ANN. § 14-1010)(1) (Supp. 1989).
75. The definition of self-neglect varies in those states that include it as part of their APS
statutes. Maryland's definition is exemplary and defines self-neglect as "the inability of a
vulnerable adult to provide [himself] ... with the services: (1)- that are necessary for the
vulnerable adult's physical and mental health; and (2) the absence of which impairs or threatens
the vulnerable adult's well-being." Id. § 14-101(p)(1)-(2); see also N.H. REa. STAT. ANN. §
161-D:3(VII) (Supp. 1990).
76. Compare ALA. CODE § 38-9-2(8) (Supp. 1990) (included under definition of neglect)
and FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.102(13) (West Supp. 1990) (same) and Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §
209.020(7) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990) (same) with MD. FAm. LAW CODE ANN. § 14-
101(p) (Supp. 1989) (separate definition for self-neglect).
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capacitated elder, his resources, or property for the exploiter's or
another's monetary profit or personal advantage. 77 At least one state
defines exploitation more restrictively as a caretaker's improper use
of funds that have been paid by the government to an adult or his
caretaker. 78 This definition has been criticized as too narrow because
it fails to protect the elder's personal resources from exploitation.
79
Varying definitions of abuse, neglect, and exploitation unfortu-
nately hinder an accurate determination of the true extent of the prob-
lem. As one author noted, "[A]cceptance of a definition should be
followed by research to accurately quantify the extent of the problem.
Agreement on definition is essential in order to compare various re-
search studies and to fashion responses." '80 More importantly, over-
broad definitions may lead to implementation of relief programs that
are more intrusive than necessary and that may unconstitutionally in-
vade the elder's independence.81
(2) Mandatory Reporting
Mandatory reporting provisions were the first major laws enacted
in response to the problem and continue today to be the mainstay of
most state elder abuse laws. Almost all state APS laws mandate a wide
variety of professionals to report known or suspected cases of elderly
abuse.8 2 The "professionals" most often include health care and social
service professionals including law enforcement officers, social work-
ers, physicians, and nurses. Some states list in detail those persons
required to report,83 and others mandate anyone with knowledge or
77. See, e.g., Miss. CODE. ANN. § 43-47-5(i) (Supp. 1990).
78. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-6-102(8) (1987).
79. Comment, supra note 4, at 751-52.
80. Faulkner, Mandating the Reporting of Suspected Cases of Elder Abuse: An Inappro-
priate, Ineffective and Ageist Response to the Abuse of Older Adults, 16 FAM. L.Q. 69, 71
(1982).
81. Id. at 80. The danger of an overbroad definition is that it may enlarge the scope of
the problem inappropriately, thereby statistically overdramatizing the need for relief. As a
result the relief fashioned may be broader than necessary and may constitute an unnecessary,
unwise, or unethical-if not unconstitutional-invasion of the older adult's independence. See
id.
82. See, e.g., ME. Ray. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3477 (Supp. 1989); MIcir. Comp. LAWS
ANN. § 400.11(a) (West Supp. 1990); see also Elder Abuse House Hearings, supra note 1, at
96 (noting that 43 states, including the District of Columbia, have enacted mandatory reporting
provisions).
83. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 19A, § 15(a) (West Supp. 1990) (physician,
medical intern, dentist, nurse, family counselor, probation officer, social worker, policeman,
firefighter, emergency medical technician, licensed psychologist, coroner, registered physical
therapist, registered occupational therapist, osteopath, podiatrist, executive director of a licensed
home health agency, or executive director of homemaker service agency).
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reasonable cause to believe that abuse has occurred to report the in-
cident. 4 Mandatory reporters typically are granted immunity from any
criminal or civil liability they might otherwise incur.85 Some states grant
absolute immunity, but others require that the report be made without
malicious intent and in good faith to qualify for complete immunity.86
In a number of states mandated reporters actually may be prosecuted
or fined for failure to report when required.
87
The majority of states either provide a guarantee of anonymity8
or confidentiality for reporters of abuse or enumerate specific cir-
cumstances under which the name of a reporter may be divulged.89
Some states stipulate that the reporter may be compelled or asked to
divulge his identity during the course of a subsequent investigation. 9°
Confidentiality or anonymity protects reporters and encourages re-
porting by those who otherwise might be hesitant for fear of retaliation
or discovery by the alleged abuser or abused. 91 In addition to the man-
84. Notably, most states attach a reasonableness standard to reporting requirements and
do not require actual knowledge of abuse. See, e.g., Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-454(A)
(Supp. 1989) (reasonable basis); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.103(I)(a) (West Supp. 1990) (knows,
or has reasonable cause to suspect); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-47-7(1) (Supp. 1990) ("[A]ny
person having reasonable cause to believe that a vulnerable adult... is being abused, neglected
or exploited shall report such information."); TEx. HuM. RES. CODE ANN. § 48.036(a) (Vernon
1990) ("[A] person having reasonable cause to believe that an elderly or disabled person is in
the state of abuse, exploitation, or neglect shall report the information to the department.").
A few states have no mandatory reporting requirement. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 55.001-
55.07 (West 1987 & Supp. 1989).
85. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.557(5) (West Supp. 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
27-7-31 (1989).
86. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.557(6) (West 1983) ("A person who intentionally
makes a false report under the provisions of this section shall be liable in a civil suit for any
actual damages suffered by the person ... so reported and for any punitive damages set by
the court or jury."); OxIcA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 10-104(E) (West Supp. 1990) (willful or
reckless false reporting leads to liability in civil suit for actual and punitive damages).
87. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-28-202 (1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 235B.1(11) (West
Supp. 1990). Critics charge that these provisions rarely are used and do not enhance effective
reporting. ALLtANCE DIVISION OF CATHOLIC CHARrTias OF SYRAcusE, AN ANALYSIS OF STATES'
MANDATORY REPORTING LAWS ON ELDER ABUSE 9 (1983) [hereinafter ALLLANCE REPORT].
88. See, e.g., CONN. GEN, STAT. ANN. § 46a-15(b) (West 1986) (reporter need not give
name at all); HAW. REv. STAT. § 349C-2(d) (Supp. 1989) (same).
89. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.107(2)-(4) (West Supp. 1990) (name of reporter only
released to employees of responsible APS department, central registry, or state attorney upon
written consent of reporter and if necessary to protect elder; to criminal justice agency
investigating the alleged abuse; to the alleged perpetrator or victim; or pursuant to either a
court subpoena or grand jury subpoena, among others); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 660.263 (Vernon
1988) (same); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 88-1908a (Harrison 1986) (identity not released except
with permission of reporter or in judicial proceeding).
90. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 39-5303(5) (1985).
91. AMERICAN PuBLic WELFARE REPORT, supra note 23, at 149.
March 1991]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
datory reporting provisions, statutes often encourage voluntary re-
porting by other individuals. 92
Mandatory reporting provisions outline the time frame within
which reporters must make the report to the designated authority or
authorities. 93 The required contents of each report also are detailed
in many statutes. 94 The authorities designated to receive reports vary
and it is common for a statute to name more than one agency as re-
sponsible for receiving reports of abuse.95
To enable individuals to report incidents of abuse at any hour,
a number of statutes mandate the establishment of a twenty-four-hour
reporting system. Florida and Mississippi, for example, each have a
single statewide toll-free telephone number to which all reports of abuse
are directed. The hotline must be staffed seven days per week, twenty-
four hours per day.96 Implementation of programs providing for twenty-
92. See, e.g., Aax. STAT. ANN. § 5-28-203(a)(3) (Supp. 1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 3479 (Supp. 1989).
93. Most states require oral reports with a follow-up written report. See ALA. CODE § 38-
9-8(a)(1) (Supp. 1990); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3477(2) (Supp. 1990). Some statutes
fail to specify a required method. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 47.24.010(a) (1990); IDAHO CODE
§ 39-5303 (1985). Others simply require that reports be made in "any reasonable manner."
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-15(a) (West 1986). The time frames within which to
make written reports vary from "as soon as possible" to one week after the initial report.
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.557(4) (West Supp. 1990) (oral report due immediately and
written report "as soon as possible"); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 19A, § 15(a) (West Supp.
1990) (written follow-up within 48 hours of oral report); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1153 (Supp.
1989) (written and oral, one week).
94. The requested information may include any number of the following items: the name
and address of the abused elderly, the reporter, the alleged abuser, and the elder's caregiver;
information relating to the nature and extent of the harm; the basis for the reporter's
knowledge; and any other information the reporter believes may be helpful in the investigation.
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.24.010(b) (1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.103(1)(b) (West Supp.
1990); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3477(2) (Supp. 1989).
95. California, for example, names five agencies as possible report recipients, including
county adult protective services, local law enforcement, long-term care ombudsman coordi-
nators, certain licensing agencies, and the Bureau of Medi-Cal Fraud. CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 15630 (West Supp. 1990); Cf. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.557(3) (West Supp. 1990)
(police department, county sheriff, local welfare agency, or appropriate licensing or certifying
agency). The majority of states designate the state human, social service, or welfare agency as
the report receiving agency. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.103(1)(a) (West Supp. 1990)
(State Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Central Registry); Ky. Rav. STAT.
ANN. § 209.030(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982) (Department for Social Services of the Cabinet
for Human Resources). A number of statutes designate local social service or welfare agencies
to receive reports. See, e.g., MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 14-302(a)(1) (Supp. 1989); MICH.
Com'. LAws ANN. § 400.11a(l) (West Supp. 1990). Many states assign at least some respon-
sibility for receiving reports to local law enforcement agencies. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 626.557(3) (West Supp. 1990) (local police department or county sheriff, among others, may
receive reports); S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-29-50(a) (Law. Co-op. 1985) (county sheriff's office or
chief county law enforcement officer in the county where the person resides or is found).
96. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.103(3)(a) (West Supp. 1990); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-47-7(6)
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four-hour assistance can prove invaluable in the event of an emer-
gency.
To date, much of the literature discussing elder abuse laws has
focused on those provisions mandating reporting of elder abuse and
has offered numerous criticisms of their requirements. 97 One major
criticism is that mandatory reporting provisions are inappropriately
modeled after child abuse reporting laws. State intervention in the case
of child abuse is based on the doctrine of parens patriae,98 which is
the traditional role of the state to act as sovereign and guardian over
persons who cannot care or speak for themselves." The doctrine is
rooted in medieval England, where guardianship of the person and
property of a mentally disabled individual initially was the respon-
sibility of the lord and then eventually was imposed on the Crown by
statute.0' Modem day guardianship proceedings, involuntary provi-
sion of medical services, and involuntary provision of elder abuse adult
protective services all are based on the state's parenspatriae obligation
or power. 01 State intervention under these circumstances hinges on a
determination that the individual is mentally incompetent or inca-
pacitated and on the state's responsibility to intervene, protect, and
preserve those who cannot care or speak for themselves. 1°2 In the case
(Supp. 1990); cf. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 19A, § 16(b) (West Supp. 1990) (the department
of elder affairs must establish a mechanism for receipt of reports on a 24-hour per day basis).
97. See Crystal, Elder Abuse: The Latest "Crisis," 88 PuB. INTEREST 56, 59-60 (1987);
Faulkner, supra note 80, at 76-91; Katz, supra note 13, at 710-15; Comment, supra note 4,
at 752-54; Note, Mandatory Reporting of Elder Abuse, 14 FoDRaDAm Ura. L.J. 723, 735-53
(1986) (authored by Dyana Lee).
98. Faulkner, supra note 80, at 76.
99. BiAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979).
100. See Faulkner, supra note 80, at 76; Horstman, Protective Services For The Elderly:
The Limits of Parens Patriae, 40 Mo. L. Rzv. 215, 218-219 (1975). For additional discussion
on the historical underpinnings of the parens patriae doctrine, see id. at 218-19; WoRaxIN
PAPER, supra note 54, at 28-29; Mitchell, The Objects of Our Wisdom and Our Coercion:
Involuntary Guardianship for Incompetents, 52 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 1405, 1409-13 (1979); cf.
Regan, Protective Services for the Elderly: Commitment, Guardianship, and Alternatives, 13
WM. & MARY L. REv. 569, 570-73 (1972) (discussing the development of protective procedures
for assisting the mentally disabled elderly).
101. See, e.g., CONSERVATORSHIP RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 5, at 8-9 (discussing parens
patriae application in guardianship or conservatorship context).
102. See id. at 8. Defining "incapacity" or "incompetence" is problematic in the context
of either guardianship proceedings or the involuntary provision of adult protective services to
individuals thought to be trapped in abusive situations. These problems are discussed in detail
in a later section of this Note. See infra notes 209-240 and accompanying text.
Notably, the state's parens patriae interest does not include a general license for the
government to control individuals' lives in the name of helping its citizens. United States v.
Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 494 (4th Cir. 1987). In the context of decisions regarding provision
of involuntary medical treatment, the court in Charters noted that
the government's parens patriae goal of protecting the well being of its citizens is
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of a child "[t]he law acts to protect . . . [him] against ... [his] own
ignorance, helplessness, and vulnerability."'' 03 Unlike an adult, who
is presumed to be competent to make his own basic life decisions, 04
a child is assumed to require a guardian with custodial authority. 05
Critics argue that mandatory reporting laws presume, solely on the
basis of advanced years, that the elderly are incompetent and unable
to know when they need or want outside assistance.' ° Requiring re-
porting of elder abuse infantilizes elders and encourages the already
pervasive ageism in our society.
0 7
More broadly, mandatory reporting is one of a number of pro-
visions in APS statutes that is criticized because it deprives elderly
citizens of their rights to self-determination. The legitimacy of state
intervention under parens patriae turns on a determination of mental
incapacity. Intervention through mandatory reporting of suspected
abuse cannot be justified or supported since the age of an individual
is the only criterion considered before the reporter is mandated to
override the individual's right to self-determination. To presume that
every adult over the age of sixty-five is unable to decide what is best
for himself is an absurd proposition. As one author put it, "once the
age of majority is reached the decision-making power over one's life
belongs to the individual; [and] that power is not lost by virtue of old
age alone. The aged do not, by definition, become incompetents who
realized ... by allowing the greatest latitude to the decisions of the individual
patient .... If an individual is competent ... [his] informed decision presumptively
is the best decision for that individual-for the individual is in the best position
thoroughly to assess and evaluate the circumstances of his own life ....
Id. at 494-95.
103. Katz, supra note 13, at 717 (footnote omitted). According to two commentators,
mandatory reporting of child abuse is based on three assumptions: (1) children are incompetent,
helpless, and vulnerable; (2) children are at the mercy of their caretakers; and (3) society has
a protectible interest in children. Palincsar & Cobb, The Physician's Role in Detecting and
Reporting Elder Abuse, 3 J. LEGAL MD. 413, 433 (1982) (footnote omitted).
104. See, e.g., Charters, 829 F.2d at 494-95 ("[Iln accordance with the well settled principle
.. 'the law will presume sanity rather than insanity, competency rather than incompetency;
[and] ... that every man is sane and fully competent until satisfactory proof to the contrary
is presented."') (citing 41 AM. JuR. 2D Incompetent Persons § 129, at 665 (1968)). The law
assumes that adults are free to live as they choose as long as they do not hurt others. Faulkner,
supra note 80, at 79; Katz, supra note 13, at 717-18. If an individual is harming others the
state may have a duty to intervene under its police power in order to protect the health,
safety, and welfare of its citizens. Police power, in contrast with parens patriae, is "[t]he
power of the State to place restraints on the personal freedom and property rights of persons
for the protection of the public safety, health, and morals or the promotion of the public
convenience and general prosperity." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1041 (5th ed. 1979).
105. Crystal, supra note 97, at 59-60.
106. Id. at 60; Faulkner, supra note 80, at 79; Katz, supra note 13, at 718-19.
107. See supra note 46 (discussing ageism).
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need protection from themselves and others."10 Mandatory reporting
laws, however, in effect assume that an abused elder does not seek
assistance because he is unable or incompetent to do so. If an elderly
individual will not report, laws dictate that someone else should do
so.'9 This assumption fails to recognize that an elder's seemingly ir-
rational nonaction actually may reflect a reasoned decision that re-
maining in the abusive situation is preferable to facing alternatives
such as eventual institutionalization. 110
The existence of mandatory reporting provisions is troublesome
particularly because a number of courts, employing a variety of ra-
tionales, have recognized that a competent adult has the right to refuse
medical treatment even if such refusal means imminent death."' The
108. Katz, supra note 13, at 717-18. The breadth (and perversity) of a presumption that
the mere fact of advanced years equates with an inability to decide matters regarding one's
own well-being and needs is all too obvious to the author. An extreme application of the
presumption illustrates its breadth.
Five of the nine Justices presently on the United States Supreme Court are over the age of
65. These "elderly" individuals have been entrusted with the responsibility of deciding matters
of profound importance that affect the lives of many (if not all) Americans. In light of their
presumed ability to make decisions that affect the lives of so many other individuals, it is
ironic, to say the least, that these same individuals would be presumed to be unable to decide
whether or not they need assistance under most state APS laws and as such would be subject
to mandatory reporting laws. Although the example is extreme and there are undoubtedly
some elders that indeed may require such extreme intervention and assistance, the overbreadth
of these provisions is clear and their implication degrading to an entire class of individuals in
our society.
109. See id. at 711; Lau & Kosberg, supra note 16, at 14.
110. Katz, supra note 13, at 711 (46% of the abused elders who received protective services
eventually were institutionalized in nursing homes). "Since institutionalization of the elderly
frequently leads to premature death, the elderly have good reason to fear the consequences of
state intervention." Id.; see also Crystal, supra note 97, at 65 (the most significant long-term
outcome of intervention was a higher rate of mortality; apparently the social service intervention
often resulted in nursing home placement, and once in institutions the elders tended not to
live as long); Lau & Kosberg, supra note 16, at 14 (Elders may remain in abusive situations
"by choice, because of counter balancing factors or because the alternatives [such as institu-
tionalization] appear more negative or frightening.").
111. Some courts have held that this right is based on an individual's right of privacy
found in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights as it was announced by the United States
Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965). See, e.g., Satz v.
Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Bartling v. Superior Court, 163
Cal. App. 3d 186, 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 224 (1984); cf. Superintendent of Belchertown v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 739-40, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (1977) (an incompetent person's
constitutional right to privacy may be asserted by that individual's guardian); In re Quinlan,
70 N.J. 10, 39-40, 355 A.2d 647, 663, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S.
922 (1976) (same). But see Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2851
n.7 (1990). Cruzan noted the likelihood that any right to refuse medical treatment is grounded
in an individual's liberty interest under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
and is not part of the constitutional right to privacy. If this is the case then the vitality of
the above-mentioned state court decisions basing this right on the federal constitutional right
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individual's right to decide whether or not he wishes to remain in an
to privacy is called into question.
To date, the United States Supreme Court has not expressly decided whether a competent
person has a constitutionally protected right to refuse life sustaining treatment or life-saving
hydration or nutrition. The Court's decision in Cruzan, however, made it clear that the Court
would recognize such a right. In Cruzan the Court considered whether a Missouri statute that
required clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent patient's wishes as to the withdrawal
of treatment comported with the requirements of the due process clause of the United States
Constitution. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852; see also id. at 2856 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id.
at 2865 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In deciding the case the Court declined to assess whether
an individual has a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.
Instead the Court noted that "for purposes of this case, we assume that the United States
Constitution would grant a competent person [such] a constitutionally protected right ...."
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852. Perhaps not surprisingly in light of the Court's recent disdain for
the constitutional "right to privacy," see, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109
S. Ct. 3040, 3043 (1989), the majority noted it likely would analyze the right to refuse treatment
as a liberty interest falling within the purview of the fourteenth amendment due process clause.
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851 n.7. The Court further stated "[tihe principle that a competent
person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment
may be inferred from our prior decisions." Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851. Although a balancing
of this liberty interest against the relevant state interests could have yielded the answer to the
Court's constitutional inquiry, the Court expressly avoided answering this question. Subsequent
to the Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan, a Missouri county probate judge determined that,
based on additional evidence put forth by the petitioners regarding Nancy Cruzan's expressed
wishes when she was alive, the petitioners had satisfied the clear and convincing evidence
requirement of the Missouri statute that was upheld by the Supreme Court. See Malcolm,
Judge Allows Removal of Woman's Feeding Tube, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1990, at 1, col. 2.
Nancy Cruzan died on December 26, 1990.
Notably, the Cruzan decision has prompted Congress to pass a federal law that will take
effect sometime in November 1991 and potentially may have a great impact on the elderly.
The Patient Determination Act requires that patients entering a federally funded hospital or
nursing home receive written information regarding state laws and their rights to refuse
treatment and about the institution's practices to enable the individual to choose an institution
that will honor his wishes. Moreover, the Act requires institutions to record whether the patient
has chosen in writing to reject life support should its use become necessary. Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388.
Despite the likelihood that the right to refuse treatment does not fall within the federal
constitutional right to privacy, California courts are among those state courts that have
determined that the right to refuse treatment exists under the privacy provisions contained in
their respective state constitutions. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d
1127, 1137, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 301 (1986); Bartling, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 195, 209 Cal. Rptr.
at 224.
The right to refuse treatment also has been upheld based on the common law right to
autonomy. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 348, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (1985); In re Storar,
52 N.Y.2d 363, 376-77, 420 N.E.2d 64, 70-71, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 272-73, cert. denied, 454
U.S. 858 (1981). It also has been upheld based solely on the competence of the patient, see,
e.g., Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 28, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705, 706 (1962), and on the
constitutional right to freedom of religious practice. See, e.g., In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372,
374 (D.C. 1972); In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 372-73, 205 N.E.2d 435, 442 (1965).
In addition, some courts have found that the right to refuse treatment is a corollary of the
common law doctrine of informed consent. "Informed consent recognizes that implicit in the
decision regarding treatment is the right to informed consent including knowing, competent,
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abusive situation or seek assistance is, of course, not analogous to a
competent individual's right to refuse medical treatment when such
treatment is futile. Undoubtedly, an argument can be posited that state
intervention in the former circumstance is not as intrusive because the
right to remain in an abusive situation implicates a far less significant
interest, be it a liberty or privacy interest, than does the right to de-
termine whether one will live or die. The analogy is useful, however,
if only to illustrate the irony that a competent elder's right to self-de-
termination and autonomy permits him to decide to end his life but,
under mandatory reporting provisions, will not empower him to decide
whether he wants or needs outside assistance to extricate himself from
an abusive situation. As one author aptly put it, "If the individual
has the right to decide whether to refuse medical care even though that
refusal may end in death, there surely is a right to make less life-threat-
ening choices regarding personal eating habits, dress, appearance,
cleanliness, and other elements of ones lifestyle."
112
Mandatory reporting laws originally were enacted on the theory
that to curb abuse, victims first had to be found and identified.13 The
belief that cases needed to be "found" was based on early studies
which indicated that abused elderly would not seek help for them-
selves. One study, for example, asserted that "[p]ride, embarrassment,
fear, isolation, lack of access to services, and mental confusion are
and voluntary consent to the procedure or treatment. See, e.g., Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 779-
83; In re Estate of Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d 33, 44-45, 549 N.E.2d 292, 297 (1989); Cobbs v.
Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972). In Cobbs, the court stated that
"a person of adult years and in sound mind has the right, in the exercise of control over his
own body, to determine whether or not to submit to lawful medical treatment." Id. at 242,
502 P.2d at 9, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 513. Notably, a number of courts have held that a competent
patient's right to refuse medical treatment is not lost because of subsequent incompetency and
that a surrogate decisionmaker may assert an incompetent's right to self-determination whether
that right is based on a constitutional liberty interest, Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852, or a privacy
interest, see In re Drabik, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 207-09, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 853-55, cert
denied, 488 U.S. 958 (1988); In re Peter by Johanning, 108 N.J. 365, 372-77, 529 A.2d 419,
422-25 (1987).
In California the right to refuse treatment has been codified in the Natural Death Act. CAL.
HEALTH & SAz-i CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1990). The Act permits a terminally ill
adult to execute an advance directive for the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining
procedures. Id. § 7188. In the context of elder abuse it is particularly interesting to note that
in passing the Act the legislature expressly recognized that "adult persons have the fundamental
right to control the decisions relating to the rendering of their own medical care." Id. § 7186.
112. Katz, supra note 13, at 720 (footnote omitted).
113. Block & Sinnott, supra note 16, at 97. The Block and Sinnott report urged states to
adopt mandatory reporting provisions. Id.; see also ELm ABUSE HousE REPORT, supra note
16, at 127 ("states may wish to consider enacting mandatory reporting legislation ... to
provide specific protections to the elderly equal to those provided to children"); Katz, supra
note 13, at 705 (noting the fear that elder abuse victims will be unprotected unless a third
party recognizes and reports the abuse).
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all obstacles to [elderly] acknowledging ...abuse and seeking pro-
fessional assistance.' 1 4 More recent commentaries, however, conclude
that mandatory reporting actually is not "finding" cases that oth-
erwise would not be reported." 5 One Maryland study indicated that
ninety-five percent of reported cases were already known to agencies
and that in many states most reports of abuse come from nonman-
dated reporters.1
6
One major assumption of any mandatory reporting system is that
adequate services will exist within the community to assist the abused
individual and to help find solutions for the problem of abuse." 7 Un-
fortunately, the services available to aid victims of elder abuse are
severely limited."18 In the area of child abuse such services and funding
have proved lacking" 9 and the level of concern regarding fiscal al-
locations for services for abused elders is even less adequate.' 20 The
American Public Welfare Association's fifty-state survey indicated that,
of the states with some form of elder abuse legislation, only eleven
specifically appropriate funds for elder abuse-related services. 12' More-
over, among these eleven states the appropriations vary greatly from
a paltry twenty thousand dollars to six million dollars annually.'2 The
figures included in the May 1990 Report of the House Subcommittee
on Health and Long-Term Care further reinforce the states' failure
to devote sufficient funds to justify the imposition of mandatory re-
porting requirements. Compared to an average state budget of more
than fifty-three million dollars annually for child protective services,
elderly protective services receive on average slightly over $2.29 million
per year. 23 California's fiscal support of APS is equally grim. Ac-
114. Lau & Kosberg, supra note 16, at 11. The 1981 House Elder Abuse report specifically
christened elder abuse a hidden problem. ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at xiii;
see also Steinmetz, supra note 40, at 55 (Battered elders often refuse to report the abuse for
fear of retaliation, lack of alternative shelter, and fear of the unknown.).
115. See ALLIANCE REPORT, supra note 87, at 17; Crystal, supra note 97, at 63; Faulkner,
supra note 80, at 78.
116. See Crystal, supra note 97, at 63. Research supports the contention that physicians
in particular have not reported incidences of elder abuse. B. HARIS & J. POERTNER, ABUSE
AND NEGLECT OF THE ELDERLY IN ILLINOIS: INCIDENCE AND CHARACTERISTICS, LEGISLATION AND
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, 1-60 to -61 (1981).
117. Faulkner, supra note 80, at 77.
118. See Elder Abuse House Hearings, supra note 1, at 96.
119. See Besharov, The Legal Aspects of Reporting Known and Suspected Child Abuse
and Neglect, 23 VILL. L. REV. 458 (1978).
120. See Note, supra note 97, at 733; Elder Abuse House Hearings, supra note 1, at 96.
121. AamRICAN PUBLIC WELFARE REPORT, supra note 23, at 14.
122. Id.
123. Elder Abuse House Hearings, supra note I, at 101 (Table No. 2, "1989 State Budgets
for Protective Services").
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cording to one source, "Since the early 1980's California's financial
commitment to the protection of elders ... at risk of abuse and ex-
ploitation has essentially held static, making no serious attempts to
either keep pace with inflation or address an increasing volume of
protective services referrals."2 Moreover, in California a competition
for funding and services between Child Protective Services and Adult
Protective Services, which began in the early 1980s and continues to-
day, has contributed to the drastic underfunding problem presently
plaguing programs to assist abused elders.'2 Enactment of mandatory
124. Silent Population, supra note 3, at 1-2; see also id. at 4 (graphs displaying the dramatic
increase in APS demand and the equally dramatic drop in purchasing power of funds allocated
for APS).
125. Id. at 2. California Representative Edward R. Roybal, Chairman of the House of
Representatives Subcommittee on Health and Long-Term Care, stated at the May 1990
Hearings:
I have been told by officials in my own state of California that although the state
mandates that elder abuse be reported, the funding to identify and assist such victims
is nearly non-existent .... While it is shameful that California spends only $59 per
child resident annually for protective services, it is a disgrace that the state devotes
less that $3 per elderly person for protective services for that age group.
Elder Abuse House Hearings, supra note 1, at 4. According to the 1990 House Report,
California's 1989 state budget for child protective services totalled $443,100,000 as compared
with $7,920,000 for elderly protective services. Id. at 101 (Table No. 2 1989 State Budgets for
Protective Services).
California's diminishing financial commitment to remedying the elder abuse problem is
clearly insufficient especially in light of the abundant commitment to Child Protective Services.
Yet, the inadequacy of funding also must be viewed, at least in part, as somewhat beyond the
state's ability to control. The lack of funding can be viewed as a product of the political
climate of the 1980s and the Reagan Administration's "New Federalist" program which
adversely affected the financial status of all states, not just California. During the 1980s the
federal government's contribution to state and local budgets dropped from a 25% contribution
in the late 1970s to 17% today; a drop that necessarily has transferred more fiscal responsibility
to the states. deCouray Hinds & Eckholm, 80s Leave States and Cities in Need, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 30, 1990, at 1, col. 1. These authors note that "[f]rom 1984 to 1988, the strong economy
helped state and local governments raise money to continue programs that had lost Federal
support. But now as the economy sours, states are saddled with heavier social responsibilities
and few options to pay for them." Id. The federal block grants to California, which support
programs including APS, were among those slashed during this period. Elder Abuse House
Hearings, supra note 1, at 96.
California and other states face yet another financial roadblock to increasing APS funding
in the future. In light of the huge California budget deficit, it not only is unlikely that state
allocations will compensate for the cuts in federal funding, but also is clear that those funds
are less likely to be increased above current spending levels. The present budget deficit totals
at least $6 billion and that figure continues to grow larger. Kershner & Lucas, Sacramento
Faces Budget Battle, S.F. Chron., Jan. 4, 1991, at A2, col. 1. According to one source, the
discrepancy between revenues and costs of services for 1991 is estimated to be between $6
billion and $9 billion as compared with the $3.6 billion cash shortfall of summer 1990. Id.;
see also deCouray Hinds & Eckholm, supra (discussing the negative impact of state budget
deficits on financing state social services and other programs).
Despite the fact that New Federalism and a huge state deficit may offer some explanation
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reporting laws in California, coupled with the cutbacks of almost a
decade ago, has compounded the problem with a sixty-four percent
increase in demand for adult protective services. 126 Without funding
for services, mandatory reporting is meaningless and inappropriate.
State intervention can be justified only if assistance is available to com-
bat the reported abuse.
1 27
A final area of concern regarding mandatory reporting is its effect
on privileged communications between professionals such as physi-
cians and their clients or patients. Many mandated reporters are
professionals who have an obligation to uphold their clients' statutory
privilege to confidential communications.128 Specific provisions within
reporting laws expressly abrogate many of these privileges. 29 As a gen-
erai principle, abrogation of the privileges alone is not necessarily of-
fensive since often there are exceptions to these privileges. Incursions
on the physician-patient privilege, for example, are justified if nec-
essary to protect society from crime-by exposing criminal offen-
ders-or to protect those who are unable to care for themselves-as
in cases of child abuse. 30 Any exception in the case of elder abuse,
however, is not tailored to protect society from crime,' but rather
is based on the familiar assumption that because of their age elders
cannot protect themselves. The incursions on these privileges ulti-
mately are examples of yet another instance in which ageism is en-
couraged. 32 Abrogation of these privileges reinforces the underlying
for the minimal commitment to the elder abuse problem, the disproportionate allocation of
those funds that do exist is inexcusable and remains subject to criticism.
126. Silent Population, supra note 3, at i.
127. As one author notes:
Most of the recently enacted elder abuse statutes, while mandating new reporting
and investigative activities, do not appropriate new funds either for these activities
themselves or for services to address the needs-of "victim," "aggressor" or
commonly both .... At best, such legislative responses constitute tokenism, while
at worst they raise the prospect of a "cure" that may be worse than the "disease."
Crystal, supra note 97, at 64.
128. See, e.g., CAL. Evm. CODE § 954 (West 1966 & Supp. 1990) (attorney-client privilege);
Id. 8 1014 (West Supp. 1990) (psychotherapist-patient privilege); Id. §§ 1030-1034 (West 1966)
(clergyman-penitent privilege).
129. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.109 (West Supp. 1990) (overriding privilege between
any professional person and his patient or client except between attorney and client).
130. Faulkner, supra note 80, at 82-83.
131. Id. at 83 (It is unlikely "that a victim of elder abuse is a participant in a crime,
unless passivity in the face of assault is criminal. Furthermore, the perpetrator of the 'crime'
... is unlikely to commit it against members of the general public."). Although arguably an
elder abuser who abuses in an institutional setting may commit similar abusive acts or "crimes"
against members of the "society" (defined as the society of the institution), it is unlikely that
an abuser abusing in a domestic or noninstitutional setting is a threat to other potential elderly
victims.
132. Faulkner, supra note 80, at 83.
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presumption that as a class elders are like infants and perpetuates the
already distorted perception of the elderly as helpless.
In addition to fears that such provisions promote ageism, critics
also worry that abridgement of these privileges will discourage elders
from seeking medical or other assistance from those professionals who
are required to report believed instances of abuse."' Elders often choose
not to seek assistance against abuse because they legitimately fear
eventual institutionalization.134 If an elder believes his doctor will re-
port suspected abuse to the authorities and thereby set in motion a
process that may end with his being removed from his home, the elder
understandably is reluctant to seek much-needed medical attention. 135
Others have voiced concern that abrogation of privileges will dis-
courage the abuser from seeking professional help such as psycho-
logical counselling. 136 Critics theorize that an abuser who knows that
his treating physician is obliged to report abuse will be deterred from
seeking the very assistance, such as in-home help caring for the elder
and counseling for himself, that may help him end his abusive be-
havior. 137
(3) Central Registries
A number of statutes mandate the establishment and maintenance
of a central registry, 138 a centralized listing of all abuse reports and
133. Id. at 84; Palincsar & Cobb, supra note 103, at 437; cf. Note, supra note 97, at 750
n.145 (evidence gleaned from experiences in the child abuse setting indicates that the clergyman-
penitent relationship also may be among those adversely affected by these provisions).
134. See supra note 110.
135. Faulkner, supra note 80, at 84.
136. Note, supra note 97, at 751.
137. Id. at 751. The same author notes that similar arguments were raised in the aftermath
of Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 2d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14
(1976), in which the California Supreme Court held that a psychotherapist has a duty to warn
a potential victim or the authorities if he suspects or knows that a patient presents a serious
danger of violence to another. Note, supra note 97, at 751 n.147. The author also suggests
that, as has been found through research regarding the effect of child abuse legislation,
professionals might not report to avoid disrupting the treatment process. Id. at 751 & n.148;
see also Faulkner, supra note 80, at 84.
Some commentators have argued that a physician may be liable in an action for negligence
if he does not report suspected abuse. Palincsar & Cobb, supra note 103, at 424. This fear is
based on the holding in a California case, Landeros v. Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399, 551 P.2d 389,
131 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976), that a pediatrician could be held liable for negligently failing to
report a suspected incident of child abuse. Id. at 399, 551 P.2d at 389, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 69.
These commentators argue that doctors who fail to report suspected cases of elder abuse may
be liable under a Landeros-like analysis. Palincsar & Cobb, supra note 103, at 424.
138. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. Amw. § 5-28-201 (1987); F A. STAT. ANN. § 415.103(3) (West
Supp. 1990); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-47-7(6) (Supp. 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 660.263(5)
(Vernon 1988).
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information regarding any subsequent investigations, to which certain
statutorily authorized individuals may gain access. 13 9 Broadly stated,
the purpose of a registry is to receive and maintain reports of abuse
in a manner that facilitates rapid access and recall of the information
reported, of subsequent investigations based on those reports, and of
other relevant information.'14
There are numerous benefits to maintaining a central registry and
many supporters feel that establishment of a centralized data system
is essential for the success of any elder abuse prevention program.'
4'
An investigator with access to the central registry is able to determine
if an alleged abuser is a known previous abuser, and likewise, if the
abused elder was reported as abused on other occasions. 42 Moreover,
a registry "can help uncover patterns of probable abuse by an abuser
when the actual evidence available is insufficient to prove abuse but
there is reason to suspect . . . [that it] has occurred."'' 43 If, for ex-
ample, an individual was reported as a suspected abuser in ten dif-
ferent cases over the course of a year but no single investigation yielded
sufficient evidence to confirm a charge of abuse, the abuser's record
as a whole could be used to support a charge of abuse. This pattern
could not be discerned readily, if at all, in a system in which county
welfare agencies or other independent local agencies maintain separate
files on individual cases of abuse and there is no central repository
or facile exchange of information. Conversely, within a central registry
system, a recurring suspect abuser could be spotted easily and sub-
sequently monitored in the event the alleged abuser continues to reap-
pear as a near-abuser in the future.
Central registries for elder abuse can be particularly useful in those
states where the APS laws either designate more than one agency as
responsible for investigating instances of abuse' 44 or mandate coor-
dination and consultation among investigatory bodies. 45 Registries can
139. See infra notes 151-157 and accompanying text (regarding who may gain access to
central registry records).
140. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 660.263(5) (Vernon 1988).
141. AMERICAN PUBLIC WELFARE REPORT, supra note 23, at 132; Note, supra note 97, at
763 & n.229.
142. AmERiCAN PUBLIC WELFARE REPORT, supra note 23, at 132.
143. Id.
144. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.104(1) (West Supp. 1990); MD. FAMd. LAW CODE
ANN. § 14-303(c) (Supp. 1988).
145. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.557(13) (West 1983) (mandating coordination
between police and local welfare agency during investigation and with reciprocal notification
upon receipt of a report of abuse); id. § 626.5571 (West Supp. 1990) (establishing multidisci-
plinary adult protection teams for use in case consultation and information sharing); cf. MD.
FAm. LAW CODE ANN. § 14-303(e) (Supp. 1989) (parties participating in the investigation may
share pertinent client information).
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make access and coordination efforts run more smoothly when more
than one agency is handling elder abuse reports because information
on any given case will be accessible to all involved in the investigation.
Finally, central registries can provide "a resource for the eval-
uation, management, and planning of preventive and remedial services
for aged persons,"'' 1 and assist in developing public education pro-
grams.1 47 This expectation is bolstered by the success of similar reg-
istries in helping manage reports of child abuse. The central registry
mechanism has proved useful in monitoring the performance of pro-
tective services, coordinating treatment efforts, and facilitating re-
search and development by creating statistical data.' 4 Perhaps the only
drawback in establishing a central registry is the cost of setting up and
maintaining the system.
(4) Confidentiality
A major concern in handling reports of abuse, whether or not
they are organized in a central registry, is maintenance of confiden-
tiality once the reports have been received and recorded. Central reg-
istries play an important role in this respect,149 as do other specific
statutory provisions that address confidentiality in states without reg-
istry systems. As noted above, confidentiality or anonymity protects
all reporters and encourages hesitant reporters. 50
Almost all states restrict the access to elder abuse records in some
manner. Most statutes stipulate that the report and all information
gathered during the subsequent investigation are not public record.' 5 '
Some specifically list individuals who have a right of access; among
these are the victim, certain agencies involved in the investigation such
as local law enforcement and administrative agencies, the court,'5 2 and
146. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.103(3)(a)(5) (West Supp. 1990); see also AJLIANCE REPORT,
supra note 87. Notably, a number of states have an exception to the general confidentiality
rule so that information in the registry "may be made available to bona fide and approved
research groups solely for the purpose of scientific research." E.g., ARx. STAT. ANN. § 5-28-
213(d) (1987).
147. AjmmcA PUBLIC WELFARE REPORT, supra note 23, at 132.
148. Note, supra note 97, at 741 n.89. Iowa prescribes that reports of dependent adult
abuse (including elder abuse) be collected, maintained, and disseminated by expanding the
central registry already in use for child abuse. IowA CODE ANN. § 235B.1(7)(a) (West Supp.
1990).
149. One author contends that states with central registries have more detailed procedures
for maintaining confidentiality of case records and authorization of access to them. Traxler,
supra note 67, at 156.
150. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.24.050(a) (1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 27-7-29(A) (1989);
TEx. HuM. R.s. CODE ANN. § 48.083 (Vernon 1990).
152. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 209.140 (Michie/Bobbs-MerrIll 1982) (information
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(in some states) bona fide and approved researchers.' 53 A number of
states mandate total confidentiality; 5 4 others provide that information
may be released with the victim's permission.'55 Some states penalize
individuals who are responsible for revealing confidential records to
unauthorized parties.
1 6
It is not difficult to understand the abused's interest in confi-
dentiality. An abused individual may be ashamed of or embarrassed
by his circumstances and perhaps fearful of the consequences of seek-
ing help-either because reporting will sever his only family link or
because he fears his abuser may retaliate. As one author notes, con-
fidentiality "is essential to protect the rights and sensibilities of the
family members involved in such proceedings, since these records often
contain information about very private aspects of family life.'
'15 7
Yet, it is important to acknowledge that the abused are not the
only persons who deserve protection. An alleged abuser is not deemed
guilty merely by virtue of an accusation. Protecting an alleged abuser
from public scrutiny seems fair, especially since reports subsequently
may be deemed unfounded or unsubstantiated. A distinction must be
drawn between alleged abusers who have been reported by mandated
or voluntary reporters and criminal suspects who have been arrested
based on probable cause. Although criminal defendants may have a
lesser confidentiality interest, alleged abusers are not necessarily crim-
inal defendants.'58 Confidentiality provisions must strike a balance be-
tween these privacy interests and the need for certain individuals, such
available to alleged abuser provided the informant's name is withheld; persons within the
department of social services and other agencies; persons with a legitimate interest in or
responsibility to the case; the court, pursuant to an order; and the alleged abused person); see
also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, para. 6608 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989) (information available to
state department on aging, law enforcement agency investigating report, physician who has a
patient he reasonably suspects may be abused, the adult reported or his guardian provided the
guardian is not the alleged abuser, the court, grand jury, bona fide researchers, and coroner);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-6-118 (1987) (release only by court order). One author has observed
that in some states the list of personnel and agencies permitted access to these records may
be too long to maintain confidentiality. Traxler, supra note 67, at 155-56.
153. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-28-213(d) (1987); ME. RaV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §
3474(2)(F) (Supp. 1989).
154. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 349C-8 (1985 & Supp. 1989).
155. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 39-5305 (1985 & Supp. 1990) (access to confidential records
only with consent of elder or legal representative).
156. Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-47-7(e) (Supp. 1990); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 200.5095(2) (McKinney
1988) (willfully permitting release of any information to persons or agencies not permitted
access is a misdemeanor).
157. Note, supra note 97, at 748.
158. Of course, some reported abusers also may be criminal defendants if they are charged
under the state's penal provisions that impose criminal penalties for elder abuse. See supra
note 59 and accompanying text.
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as those investigating charges of abuse, to have ready access to the
information to formulate responses and assist needy elders.
(5) Expungement of Records
The majority of APS statutes have few provisions designed to
assure that the rights of alleged perpetrators or victims of abuse are
protected. Other than the confidentiality provisions, only a few states
with central registry systems provide additional means of protection
for alleged abusers. Select states provide for amendment of reports
or expungement of records from the registry if the reports are de-
termined to be inaccurate or unsubstantiated.
The language and detail of the provisions vary. A number merely
provide that once a report is deemed "unsubstantiated," all records
relating to that report must be expunged. 159 Others permit an alleged
abuser (or victim) to request that an inaccurate or unsubstantiated
report be corrected or expunged. 160
Although expungement mechanisms are useful, more elaborate
means of shielding the accused are preferable and have been imple-
mented in a handful of states. 161 Among the statutes that afford the
alleged abuser the most protection are those with central registry sys-
tems that classify all investigated reports of abuse as unsubstantiated,
confirmed, or containing some indication of abuse but insufficient
evidence to confirm the report.162 Even better are those statutes that
159. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-28-212 (1987); IDAHO CODE § 39-5303(3) (1985 &
Supp. 1990).
160. See, e.g., MIcH. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 400.lld(3) (West 1988) (once investigation is
completed any person who is the subject of a report may request the director to correct an
inaccurate statement or clearly identify an unsubstantiated statement); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 1155(d) (1982 & Supp. 1990) (may request expungement of unsubstantiated reports).
161. In this respect, Florida has taken the lead and established one of the most compre-
hensive systems for handling reports of abuse and assuring that the rights of an alleged abuser
remain untrammeled. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.103(3)(b)-(d) (West Supp. 1990); see also
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-720 to -724 (1989) (information identifying subjects of unfounded reports
shall be expunged; subjects of a report shall be provided with a copy of the report upon
request and shall have the right to a hearing if a request to amend or expunge information is
denied).
162. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. AN. § 415.103(3)(c) (West Supp. 1990). A "confirnmed"
designation indicates that abuse, neglect, or exploitation has occurred and the perpetrator has
been identified. Id. § 415.102(5). An "indicated" designation means that a subsequent inves-
tigation has determined that some indication of abuse, neglect, or exploitation exists. Id. §
415.102(11). An "unfounded" designation means the investigation established that no indication
of abuse, neglect, or exploitation exists. Id. § 4i5.102(15); see also NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-720
(1989) (cases classified as "court substantiated," "petition to be filed," "investigation incon-
clusive," or "unfounded report").
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contain fixed procedures by which the accused may challenge these
classifications or the contents of the registry. These procedures in-
clude, but are not limited to, notice of the classification assigned to
a given report of abuse, the opportunity to request amendment or
expunction of inaccurate or inconsistent records, and notice of any
amendments to or expunctions of the record. 163 Finally, some states
define time frames within which certain records must be expunged.
64
Such expungement procedures serve two important functions. Fore-
most, provided the records exist long enough to enable authorities to
discern a pattern of near-substantiated instances of abuse by a given
recidivist alleged abuser, such procedures protect alleged abusers from
possible exposure to ridicule and discrimination in the unlikely event
unsubstantiated records leak out. Secondly, such expungement pro-
cedures undoubtedly promote administrative efficiency.
(6) Penalties for the Abuser
The majority of state APS laws do not prescribe penalties against
the perpetrator. State statutes outlining penalties vary with respect to
163. See, e.g., FL. STAT. ANN. § 415.103(3)(c)-(e) (West Supp. 1990). Florida requires
that both the alleged perpetrator and victim be notified of the assigned classification upon
completion of the investigation. Id. § 415.103(3)(c). If the record is found to be inaccurate,
the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is mandated to amend or expunge the
inaccurate information and to notify the alleged perpetrator and victim of any such changes.
Id. § 415.103(3)(d)(1). The alleged perpetrator or victim may request such an amendment or
expungement. Id. § 415.103(3)(d)(2). Notice to the alleged perpetrator of a confirmed report
must include the following information: that the report has been confirmed; that the individual
may request amendment or expunction within 30 days of the classification; that he may request
more information regarding the report; and that failure to ask for a timely amendment or
expunction means the alleged abuser agrees not to contest the classification. Id. § 415.103(3)(d)(3).
Notably, the alleged abuser still may request that the confirmed report be set aside if he does
so within a year of his failure to request timely amendment or expunction, but only if such
failure was due to excusable neglect or fraud. Id. § 415.103(3)(d)(4). If a requested amendment
or expunction is either denied or not acted upon within 30 days, the Florida statute provides
that the alleged perpetrator has a right to an administrative hearing to contest the determination.
At the hearing the burden of proof rests on the department to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the perpetrator committed the abuse. Failure to request such hearing means
the accused does not contest the classification. If the hearing results in the classification being
upheld it shall remain "confirmed." Id. § 415.103(3)(d)(5); see also NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-723
to -724 (1989).
164. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.103(3)(c) (West Supp. 1990) (all information related
to "unfounded" reports shall be expunged within one year after the case is so classified and
all information related to an "indicated" report shall be expunged seven years from the date
of the last indicated report concerning any person named in the report); MAss. G N. LAws
ANN. ch. 19A, § 23(b) (West Supp. 1990) (within three months of a determination that the
report is unsubstantiated, either the report and all information gathered as a result of it shall
be destroyed or all personal identifiers shall be removed); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1155(c)
(1982 & Supp. 1990) (destruction of all records relating to a given elderly individual not sooner
than 90 days after his death).
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who may be held accountable for abuse, neglect, or exploitation and
with respect to the penalty assessed against the perpetrator. In most
states an abuser is guilty of a misdemeanor and may be fined or im-
prisoned.' 6 The class of misdemeanor and the fine or penalty assessed
vary considerably among the statutes and within some statutes, de-
pending sometimes on the type of abuse perpetrated and on the iden-
tity of the perpetrator. 166 Fines for misdemeanors generally range from
five hundred to ten thousand dollars and the term of imprisonment
is typically no longer than one year.' 67 Finally, a number of states
classify some types of elder abuse as felonies and consequently impose
stricter penalties.' 6
8
Most often the statutes define those who may be held liable as
the elder's caretaker or any other person who willfully commits an
abusive act or omission. 169 "Caretaker" typically is defined as an in-
dividual or facility responsible for the care of a vulnerable adult as
a result of family relationship, voluntarily, by contract, or by agree-
ment. 70
Provisions that limit liability to caretakers as well as those that
extend it more broadly to "anyone" have been criticized. Limiting
liability to caretakers acknowledges that caretakers, who presumably
have assumed the responsibility for care, should be held accountable.
Unfortunately this narrow reading ignores the fact that the abuse and
exploitation can be, and often is, perpetrated by those who do not
have formal caretaking responsibility for the elder.'7' "The dubious
165. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-29-41 (Law. Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-
6-117 (1987).
166. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-28-103 (1987). In Arkansas the abuser is guilty of a
Class D felony if the abuse results in great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent
disfigurement; of a Class B misdemeanor if he permits physical or mental health of an adult
to be materially endangered; and of a Class C misdemeanor if he negligently deprives an adult
of food, shelter, or medical treatment. See also Ky. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 209.990 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1982 & Supp. 1990); Nav. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 200.5099 (Michie 1986); cf. VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1159 (Supp. 1989) (not classified as a "misdemeanor" or "felony" per
se but abuser fined up to $10,000, or imprisoned up to one year, or both).
167. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-29-41 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (fined between $500 and
$5,000, or imprisoned for 90 days to five years); TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-6-117 (1987) (fined
no more than $1,000, imprisoned for no greater than 11 months and 29 days, or both).
168. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-28-103 (1987); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 209.990
(Michie/Bobbs-Merril 1982 & Supp. 1990).
169. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-28-103 (1987) ("whoever"); Ky. Ray. STAT. ANN. §
209.990 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982 & Supp. 1990) ("anyone" and "caretaker"); Mss. CODE
ANN. § 43-47-19 (Supp. 1990) ("any caretaker or other person"); Nav. REv. STAT. ANN. §
200.5099 (Michie 1986) ("any adult person"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1159(a)-(b) (Supp.
1990) ("any person" and "caretaker").
170. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 47.24.100(3) (1990); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-47-5(c) (Supp.
1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-6-102(5) (1987).
171. Comment, supra note 4, at 752.
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constitutionality" of statutes that cast a wider net of liability also has
been raised. 72 One author is particularly disturbed by the vague def-
initions of the circumstances or relationships between the alleged per-
petrator and the victim of neglect that give rise to liability. He notes
that the concept of neglect implies a disregard of a duty of care, which
the law usually does not impose even on family members except for
spouses. The author finds that there have been few criminal prose-
cutions under the laws, that the possibility of such prosecutions is a
poor defense for these "Draconian penalties," and that the laws both
breed lack of respect for the law and encourage selective prosecu-
tion. 173
(7) Investigations
All state statutes provide for some type of initial investigation
after a report of alleged abuse is received. The laws vary with respect
to which agency has responsibility for conducting this investigation.
The majority of statutes name the state human services, social services,
or welfare department as the entity with primary responsibility. 174 A
number of statutes assign this responsibility to the local welfare
agency 75 or law enforcement agency. 76 Depending on the type of sus-
pected harm, many statutes provide for certain reports to be referred
to a specific agency for investigation. For example, law enforcement
agencies or the district attorney's office often are referred cases in-
volving suspected violations of the state's penal code or danger of
imminent grave bodily harm. 177 Jurisdiction over abuse investigations
172. Crystal, supra note 97, at 62-64.
173. Id.
174. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 47.24.020(a) (1990) (Department of Health and Social
Services); IDAHO CODE § 39-5303(3) (1985) (Idaho Department of Health and Welfare); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 43-47-9(1) (Supp. 1990) (State Department of Public Welfare).
175. See, e.g., MD. FAlm. LAW CODE ANN. § 14-303(a) (Supp. 1989); cf. MICH. CoMP.
LAWS ANN. § 400.11b (West 1989) (social services department).
176. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 660.261 (Vernon 1988) (department of social services
shall either investigate or refer report to appropriate law enforcement agencies).
177. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.104(1) (West Supp. 1990) (if during the investigation
the department believes the abuse was perpetrated by a second party it shall contact the
appropriate criminal justice agency, which will conduct a criminal investigation concurrent
with the protective services investigation); MD. F m. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 14-303(c), 14-304(a)
(Supp. 1989) (if a representative from the local department of social services believes an
emergency exists he may contact local law enforcement officials); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §
161-D4(II) (Supp. 1990) (requiring referral of all cases of serious bodily injury to the department
of justice or county attorney).
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sometimes is determined by the type of locale where the suspected
abuse is alleged to have occurred. The fact that the reported abuse
took place in a long-term care facility, for example, often will dictate
the agency responsible for the investigation.' 7 Some states assign in-
vestigatory responsibility to whichever agency receives the initial report
of abuse. 179 Other states fail to address clearly who ultimately is re-
sponsible for the investigation. 80 In most states more than one agency
has jurisdiction to conduct an investigation 8 ' and cooperation between
or among these entities is encouraged or mandated to ensure efficient
and appropriate handling of cases. 82
The time frame within which an investigation must be initiated
also varies. The specific time limits delineated in the statutes range
from within twenty-four hours of receiving the report to ten days
thereafter.'83 Many states do not establish a specific time frame, re-
quiring an investigation to begin "promptly."'' " The significance of
when an investigation commences varies with the abusive situation.
If the report indicates the situation is an emergency the response time
clearly must be shorter. Conversely, for less time sensitive allegations,
such as financial exploitation, a longer response time may be adequate
178. See, e.g., ARx. STAT. ANN. § 5-28-210(a) (Supp. 1989) (investigation involving endan-
gered adult resident in a long-term care facility conducted by sheriff or Office of Attorney
General).
179. See, e.g., NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 200.5093(5) (Michie 1986).
180. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 43-29-10 to 43-29-100 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
181. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.104(1) (West Supp. 1990); MD. FAm. LAW CODE
ANN. § 14-303(c) (Supp. 1989).
182. See, e.g., IowA CODE § 235B.1(7)(b) (West Supp. 1990) (county attorneys, law
enforcement agencies, multidisciplinary teams, and social services in the state shall cooperate
and assist in the evaluation upon the request of the department of human services); MD. F m.
LAW CODE ANN. § 14-303(c) (Supp. 1989) (on request by the local department of social
services, the local state's attorney or the appropriate law enforcement agency shall assist in
the investigation); see also MwN. STAT. ANN. § 626.557(13) (West 1983 & Supp. 1990) (police
department, county sheriff, and local welfare department agency shall cooperate in their
investigation).
183. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.104(1) (West Supp. 1990) (all investigations to begin
within 24 hours); MD. FAi. LAW CODE ANN. § 14-303(a) (Supp. 1989) (within five days for
regular report and within 24 hours for an emergency).
184. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 39-5303(3) (1985) ("prompt and thorough evaluation"); LA.
Ra,. STAT. ANN. § 14:403:2(E)(1) (West 1986 & Supp. 1990) ("promptly"). Notably, in some
states the required time frame for commencement of an investigation varies based on an initial
determination whether the report of abuse requires an immediate investigation or the report
indicates that an emergency exists. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.103(5)(b) (West Supp.
1990) ("prompt" initiation of an investigation if initial review determines report requires
immediate onsite protective investigation); MD. FAm. LAw CODE ANN. § 14-303(a) (Supp.
1989) (begin thorough investigation within five working days if report not indicative of an
emergency situation; within 24 hours if it is).
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and indeed wise since it would free up more resources to respond to
more urgent reports. Some states also provide a time constraint within
which each investigation must be completed. In Florida, for example,
the investigation must be completed within thirty days of the initial
report. 85
The scope of an investigation varies from state to state. The ma-
jority of such provisions require the investigator to visit the alleged
abuse victim. 186 Many statutes also list the information to be gathered
during the interview and investigation. Usually these include an anal-
ysis of the nature, scope, and extent of the abuse, identification of
the individual responsible for the abuse, identification of the elder's
caretaker and family members, and an evaluation of the home or res-
idential environment. 18 7 The investigation also may encompass a med-
ical, psychological, psychiatric, social, vocational, or educational
review, 188 or an analysis of the immediate and long-term risk to the
aged individual. 18 9
Unfortunately, the majority of state APS laws do not address
whether consent of the elder who is the subject of the investigation
is required or whether an elder has the right to refuse to consent to
an investigation. 190 In these states it appears that no consent is required
for an investigation to be conducted regardless of the elder's capacity
to consent. A handful of states, however, directly acknowledge and
protect the elder's, or his caretaker's, right to refuse such an inves-
tigation. Under these provisions, if an elder refuses consent or with-
draws consent to an investigation, the investigation must be terminated
immediately.'91 Nevertheless, among the states that accord the elder
185. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.104(2) (West Supp. 1990); see also MD. FAm. LAW CODE ANN.
§ 14-303(d) (Supp. 1989) (within 30 days or within 10 days if an emergency exists).
186. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.24.020(a) (1990) (personal interview unless the elder is
unconscious or otherwise physically or mentally impaired to such an extent he cannot answer);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-16(a) (West 1986) (visit to elder and consultation with individuals
having knowledge of the facts of the particular case); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, para. 6605
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989) (same).
187. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-28-210(c) (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.104(1) (West
Supp. 1990); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:403.2 (West 1986 & Supp. 1990); MICH. Comap. LAWS
ANN. § 400.llb(3) (West Supp. 1990).
188. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-28-210(c) (1987); MICH. Corn'. LAWS ANN. § 400.llb(3)
(West Supp. 1989).
189. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.104(1)(d) (West Supp. 1990).
190. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-16 (West 1986); HAW. REv. STAT. § 349C-
3 (Supp. 1989); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:403.2(E)(1) (West 1986 & Supp. 1990); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 660.260 (Vernon 1988); cf. MASS. GEM. LAWS ANN. ch. 19A, § 18 (West Supp. 1990)
(no consent required for investigation, but elderly shall receive written notice that assessment
is being conducted and shall have the right to review the file and the report developed as a
result of the assessment).
191. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.24.020(c) (1990); CAL. WELV. & INsT. CODE § 1565(a)
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this control, most also provide that under certain circumstances, an
investigation may continue despite the elder's stated wishes. Kentucky,
for example, provides that absent consent from the elder or his care-
taker, a search warrant to enable the investigation to continue may
issue on probable cause that the elder is being abused.192 Moreover,
in Alaska, although an investigation must be terminated upon the eld-
er's request, if the investigating department has reasonable cause to
believe that the elder is incapacitated, the department may petition the
court for appointment of a temporary guardian to obtain consent to
conduct an investigation. 193
The question whether an elder's consent must be obtained for an
investigation to go forward is similar to that addressed earlier in the
context of mandatory reporting provisions; concerns of elder auton-
omy must be balanced against the state's perceived interest in the ap-
propriate exercise of its parens patriae power. 94 Since the elderly in
our society are presumed to be competent adults, it can be argued that
at least in the context of a noncriminal investigation, they should have
the legally recognized right to refuse to cooperate in the investigation
and certainly be given the opportunity to refuse access to their homes.
Conversely, an argument can be made that some kind of investigation
must be conducted regardless of the elder's consent, at least to de-
termine whether the elder has the capacity to refuse an investigation
or whether the elder is refusing the investigation out of fear or in-
timidation caused by a third party. Making such a determination may
be in both the elder's and the state's interests.
A better system would permit an investigation to go forward with-
out the express consent of the elder at least to the point at which the
APS investigator can conclude, in accordance with both a specific def-
inition of incapacity and a set of criteria for its determination, whether
the elder is capable of consenting and whether he has been the victim
(West 1990); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 209.030(6) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 1154(b) (Supp. 1989).
192. Ky. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 209.030(6) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982).
193. ALASKA STAT. § 47.24.020(c) (1990).
194. See supra notes 97-112 and accompanying text. Investigations conducted under the
state's parens patriae authority, including investigations conducted in nonemergency situations
in which it is feasible to solicit consent from the elder, must be distinguished from those
emergency situations in which obtaining consent to investigate may not be feasible and actually
may be unreasonable. In emergency situations in which there is an imminent threat to life or
of grave bodily injury, the state's power to act does not derive from parens patriae but rather
from its duty to preserve the lives of its citizens. The distinction between the state's right to
act in a nonemergency versus an emergency situation is not borne out as much in the provisions
regarding investigation of alleged elder abuse as it is in the actual provision of protective
services.
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of undue influence. 195 If the elder has capacity and was not coerced,
his wishes must be heeded. If he is not capable or was intimidated,
the APS agency must petition the court for an order. The order, on
a showing that the elder is incapacitated or unduly coerced into giving
consent, would enjoin the elder to cooperate and permit the agency
to go forward with the investigation on the grounds that the elder is
incapable of consenting or would enjoin the third party from inter-
fering with the elder's ability to consent freely.
Many statutes have provisions that specifically address the ques-
tion of what may be done when an investigator, in an attempt to con-
duct his investigation or personal interview with the elder, is denied
access to the alleged victim. Most laws only deal with the situation
in which the elder's caretaker refuses to allow the investigator access
to the elder; 196 some provide mechanisms for gaining entry when any-
one, including the elder, denies entry. 197 Provisions that deal solely
with the circumstances under which a caretaker is impeding access
would appear not to offend notions of the elder's self-determination.
These sections presumably are aimed only at situations in which the
elder already has consented to the investigation and its commencement
or continuation is thwarted by acts of a third party. Provisions al-
lowing access when the elder refuses, in contrast, are troublesome for
the same reasons investigations without consent are difficult to justify:
they potentially could override a capable elder's rights to self-deter-
mination.
Both the legal basis and procedures for an investigator's entry into
the elder's home vary. Some states provide that any nonconsensual
entry should be made only by a protective services worker with police
assistance.' 98 A number only permit such entry if a warrant is issued
based on probable cause.' 99 Others require a lesser showing of "rea-
195. Except in an emergency, a determination that an elder is "incapacitated" or lacks
capacity to consent is the primary means by which adult protective services are provided on a
nonconsensual basis. There is a great deal of controversy over what the appropriate definition
of incapacity should be in this context and who should be responsible for applying it. See
infra notes 209-240 and accompanying text. Similar concerns regarding a carefully drafted
definition also adhere in the context of investigations.
196. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-28-210(c)(6) (Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.104(1)
(West Supp. 1990); MIss. CODE ANN. § 43-47-9(1) (Supp. 1990).
197. See, e.g., HAW. REv. STAT. § 349C-3 (Supp. 1989); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN.
§ 400.11b(4) (West Supp. 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 660.270 (Vernon 1988). The Hawaii
provisions even penalize individuals who prevent access to the elder, prescribing that any
person who intentionally or knowingly obstructs or interferes with the investigating department's
access to or communication with the elder is guilty of a misdemeanor.
198. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.104(1) (West Supp. 1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 349C-
3 (Supp. 1989).
199. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3483(1) (Supp. 1990) (if court has appointed
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sonable suspicion," with or without a warrant, for a protective serv-
ices worker accompanied by an officer to enter the premises." Some
provisions stipulate that the court order the caretaker to allow entrance
for the investigation. 2°'
(8) Provision of Services
Once an investigation is completed or the elder requests assis-
tance, provision of protective services may be recommended for the
elder. APS statutes typically contain at least some provisions that are
aimed at providing services to needy adults. These services are de-
signed to assist elders in whatever way they require, while also per-
mitting the elder to continue residing in the community. A detailed
discussion of the variety and adequacy of the services offered in the
"services" portion of adult protective services is beyond the scope of
this Note; however, the following discussion briefly describes the con-
tours of what constitutes "services."
The services component generally includes some combination of
health, social, psychological, medical, and legal assistance.M These
services are not intended to function as random aids administered by
unrelated agencies. Rather, the goal is to render coordinated services
and assistance through a caseworker, usually a social worker, who can
assess the individual's needs and combine the various programs and
community resources to meet those needs. 20 3 The services offered vary
and often include visiting nurses, clinical services, special transpor-
tation, and hot home-delivered meals.2 These services are intended,
among other things, to alleviate or prevent harm resulting from elder
abuse. The availability of services depends on the funding allocated
by the state to assist abused elders. As was discussed in the context
a guardian and the ward or caretaker refuses to relinquish care or custody, a law enforcement
officer may enter the property with a warrant based on probable cause to believe the ward is
there); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 660.270 (Vernon 1988) (warrant issued if probable cause exists that
the eligible adult faces a likelihood of serious physical harm and is in need of protective
services and that the investigator has been prevented by another person from investigating).
200. See, e.g., HAw. REV. STAT. § 349C-3 (Supp. 1989).
201. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-28-210(6) (Supp. 1990) (court shall order the caretaker
to allow access "upon cause shown"); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-47-9(1) (Supp. 1990) (petition
court to enjoin caretaker from interfering with the investigation); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 660.270
(Vernon 1988) (petition for a warrant, seek an order to enjoin, or both).
202. AmERIcAN PuBLIc WELFARE REPORT, supra note 23, at 153-57.
203. Regan, supra note 52, at 251; see also WoRKING PAPER, supra note 54, at 20-21;
REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, HEALTi & WELFARE AGENCY, DEP'T OF
Soc. SERVICES, EVALUATION OF THE ADULT PROTECTIVE SERVICES AND ELDER/DEPENDENT
ADULT EMERGENCY SHELTER DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS 54-55 (1988).
204. See WoRKING PAPER, supra note 54, at 4.
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of mandatory reporting, funding available to assist abused elders once
their cases have been "discovered" is woefully inadequate nationwide,
particularly in California.205
In most states protective services may be provided only if the elder
consents. If consent is withdrawn, the services must terminate. 206 Many
states have procedures for dealing with a situation in which a caretaker
or other person prevents protective services from being administered
after the elder has consented to their provision.20 These sections do
not pose the same problems as those that permit an investigation to
go forward despite an elder's protests. Rather, these sections are de-
signed to effectuate the elder's expressed desire to receive assistance.
They allow the aid to be rendered unimpeded by a third party who
wishes to prevent provision of services. These sections-unlike those
provisions that permit an investigator to thwart the elder's desires to
halt an investigation-do not offend notions of self-determination.
Most states, however, stipulate that the state may provide protective
services absent consent under certain circumstances. These provisions
permit involuntary or nonconsensual intervention, based on the elder's
"lack of capacity," and emergency intervention. The following sec-
tions explore these provisions and raise concerns regarding their ap-
plication.
(9) Involuntary or Nonconsensual Intervention
The majority of state APS laws include an exception to the re-
quirement of consent to services when the elder has been determined
to be incapacitated. 20 8 Although implementation of a carefully drafted
provision permitting this type of intervention would not pose a serious
threat to elder autonomy, there are a number of problems with many
of the existing provisions.
a. A Definition of "Lacks Capacity to Consent," "Incapacity," or
"Incompetence": Its Absence or Impropriety
The first and most fundamental problem with these provisions is
that many of the statutes do not include a definition of "lacks capacity
205. See supra notes 117-127 and accompanying text.
206. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, para. 6609(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); ME. R y.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3481(1) (Supp. 1989). Although the statutes do not so indicate, the
author assumes that an elder who withdraws his consent to services must have the capacity to
do so.
207. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 47.24.030(b) (1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 27-7-23(B) (Supp.
1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 660.275 (Vernon 1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 10-106(B)
(West Supp. 1990).
208. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.24.030(a) (1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-19
(West Supp. 1990).
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to consent" and there is no case law interpreting the meaning of the
phrase as it relates to elder abuse victims. 2° The absence of a definition
leaves the door open to subjective and ad hoc determinations of ca-
pacity. 210 Furthermore, its absence is troubling because a finding of
"lack of capacity" by the investigatory agency most often leads to the
institution of temporary guardianship or conservatorship proceedings,
which in turn may and often do result in a permanent guardianship
or conservatorship. 21' Guardianships and conservatorships not only
strip elders of the right to make basic choices regarding daily living,
but deny them the right to make more important life choices and ul-
timately diminish, if not extinguish, their fundamental rights to self-
determination.
Of perhaps greater concern is the fact that some states do not even
require a determination of "lack of capacity" before an elder may be
required to receive services absent consent. A number of statutes stip-
ulate that services be delivered with the elder's consent unless the in-
dividual is "unable ... to accept such services. '21 2 These statutes
contain no definition of the vague and easily manipulated term "un-
able" and therefore create the same dangers that exist with the un-
defmed phrase "lacks capacity to consent." Even more disturbing are
statutes that permit involuntary intervention when an elder "refuse[s]
to consent ' 213 or is "unwilling" to consent. 21 4 Clearly, the state's as-
sertion that it has the authority to provide services to an elder who
is "unwilling" or who "refuses" them, without any determination that
209. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 38-9-4 (Supp. 1990); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-19 (West
Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, para. 6609(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 39-1424(a) (1986).
A discussion of courts' interpretations of the meaning of "lacks capacity to consent" or
"incompetence" in the context of imposing a guardianship or conservatorship on an individual
may provide insight with respect to future courts' interpretations of these phrases in adult
protective services laws. Although a later portion of this Note generally discusses the various
definitions of incapacity or incompetence that are employed in guardianship statutes, see infra
notes 216-239 and accompanying text, a substantial review of judicial opinions regarding the
validity of these various definitions is beyond the scope of this Note. A clear and concise
statutory definition of these terms is desirable as a starting point from which courts can launch
their analyses.
210. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 100, at 1420-21; see also infra note 228 and accom-
panying text.
211. For a discussion of guardianship and conservatorship, see infra notes 245-278 and
accompanying text.
212. ALA. CODE § 38-9-4 (Supp. 1990) (in such case, services are to be delivered upon
order of the court); see also MD. FA.m. LAW CODE ANN. § 14-307(b) (Supp. 1989).
213. Ky. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 209.100 (Michie/Bobbs-Merril 1982).
214. ALA. CODE § 38-9-4 (Supp. 1990); see also MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 14-307(b)
(Supp. 1989) (permitting intervention "if the individual is unwilling or unable to accept
protective services voluntarily").
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the individual lacks the ability to make such a decision, is a blatant
infringement on the elder's right to self-determination. This is clear
not only in light of the established notion that a competent adult has
the right to refuse treatment 25 and by the basic premise that an adult
is presumptively competent, but also from the fact that the decision
to refuse services is not by itself an indicator of incompetence.
21 6
Even with respect to those states that define "incapacity," "lack
of capacity," or "incompetence," the substance of these definitions
is subject to criticism. These criticisms are the same as those that have
been levied against the employment of similar definitions in guardi-
anship statutes.
Some states use old age to denote incapacity, which is a patently
inappropriate practice. At least one state includes impairment by rea-
son of "advanced age" in its adult protective services statute as one
of the criteria for finding lack of capacity. 217 According to one recent
comprehensive study of state guardianship laws, fifteen states list ad-
vanced age as one of the disabilities that comprise the definition of
incapacity. 218 Using advanced years to rob elders of their rights to self-
determination is unacceptable. As already discussed in the context of
mandatory reporting, "[o]ld age is not a disease .... [Nor] is it syn-
onymous with mental weakness. The continuing use of old age as a
triggering event for the loss of fundamental rights stigmatizes the en-
tire class of elderly persons and imposes a built in handicap for aged
individuals.' '219
Definitions of incapacity or incompetence commonly are tied to
the diagnosis of a particular medical condition, either a mental or
physical infirmity. The statutes typically state that an adult is incom-
215. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978). Notably, one
state APS statute expressly recognizes this right. New York's code states that "refusal by the
adult to accept protective services shall not in itself be sufficient evidence of . .. lack of
capacity," and that "mental illness shall not in itself be sufficient evidence of such lack of
capacity." N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 473-a(l)(a)(ii) (McKinney 1983).
217. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-55.2 (1987); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.102(3) (West
Supp. 1990) (aged person defined as someone suffering from the infirmities of aging as
manifested, inter alia, by "advanced age"); Crystal, supra note 97, at 65 (identifying that
elder abuse laws "frequently fail to distinguish between an individual's capacity for good
judgment and simply being old.").
218. DETERMINING COMPETENCY IN GUARDIANSHIP PROcEEDINGs 6 (S. Anderer, N. Coleman,
E. Lichtenstein & J. Parry ed. 1990) [hereinafter S. ANDERER]. The author notes,
Many states, however, have eliminated advanced age from their statutes, recognizing
that it is not an illness or disability, and that it does not necessarily carry with it a
decline in functional ability. When substantial decline does occur, it is the result of
pathology rather that the healthy aging process.
Id.
219. Horstman, supra note 100, at 263; see also WORKING PAPER, supra note 54, at 36.
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petent or incapacitated if "impaired by reason of mental illness, men-
tal deficiency, physical illness or disability, chronic use of drugs, chronic
intoxication. "m Fifteen state guardianship statutes define specific
mental illnesses that render an individual incapacitated, 22 thirty-four
states use more general terms to denote mental incapacity, and thirty-
one refer to chronic drug use or intoxication. 2m Thirty-three states also
include physical illness or disability within their definitions of inca-
pacity or incompetence.m2 One critic of this approach to defining in-
capacity or incompetence in the context of guardianship proceedings
charges that employment of a medical model means that the question
whether guardianship is appropriate is answered by medical experts
who testify regarding matters lay persons cannot easily comprehend.
He argues that courts conducting this medical inquiry
[i]nstead of concentrating on questions about the functional abilities
or inabilities of the proposed ward, . . . concentrate[s] on the con-
dition of [the elder's] mind, . . . measured not in terms of common
sense behavior, but by medical opinion. Since the medical opinion
often fails to connect its labels with any operative behavior, the [el-
der] is merely categorized by means of a conclusionary diagnostic
label without further explanation. In short, medical disability has
become confused with legal disability.224
Another author specifically criticizes determining incapacity solely
by the diagnosis of physical illness. The author argues that "[a] de-
termination of incapacity that results from physical illness in the ab-
sence of impairment of cognition or communication would appear to
be inappropriate. If persons are cognitively intact-although they may
need some level of physical assistance-they should be permitted to
make their own decisions regarding assistance." 22 The same author
asserts that
[i]ncapacity is a legal-not a medical-decision. The legal concept
of incapacity (or incompetence) does not have a ready analogue in
the medical or mental health fields, and the standards used by profes-
sionals in those fields may differ widely from legal standards. The
issue of capacity is one that should be presented to the court as a
triable issue of fact. Input from health professionals should be sought,
but the court bears the ultimate responsibility to assess evidence about
the abilities and limitations of the proposed ward and to determine
incapacity. 226
220. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 27-7-16(K) (Supp. 1990); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.102(12)
(West Supp. 1990); VA. CODE Am. § 63.1-55.2 (1987).
221. S. ANDERER, supra note 218, at 4-5.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 5.
224. Horstman, supra note 100, at 227-28 (footnotes omitted).
225. S. ANDEE R, supra note 218, at 5.
226. Id. at 7-8 (footnotes omitted); see also Friedman & Savage, Taking Care: The Law
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Definitions that require a factual evaluation of the elder's ability
to understand, communicate his needs, or make decisions as a measure
of capacity also have been attacked as inadequately protecting elders'
interests and as inappropriate measures of capacity. These definitions
typically include language regarding the elder's "lack of capacity to
comprehend the nature and consequences of remaining in a situation"22
or "lack[] of sufficient understanding or capacity to make or com-
municate responsible decisions." 8 Some guardianship statutes also
include the terms "responsible" or "effectively" in the language of
similar provisions defining incapacity. 229 These vague definitions, how-
ever, invite individual, subjective interpretation 2 0 and instead of ad-
dressing the all important question whether an individual is capable
of caring for himself, "base[] the determination on cognitive ability
to make 'responsible' decisions . . . [and are] . . . vague and value-
laden standard[s].' ' Another commentator notes that "[t]he use of
such terms allows for the intrusion of value judgment into the de-
termination of incapacity. [They] turn the focus of the determination
away from the person's capacity to engage in the decisionmaking proc-
ess and toward an evaluation of the societal responsibility of the result
of the person's decisions."
232
of Conservatorship in California, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 273, 283-84 (1988). These authors note
that although conservatorships arguably only are justified when an individual is mentally
impaired, their study indicated that "[i]n practice, it does not seem that conservatorship is as
strictly limited to the mentally impaired as theory and [the California] statute might demand.
Half or more wards were able to give 'intelligible' responses at the time of the annual review."
Id.
227. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 473-al(a) (McKinney 1983); see also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-
28-301(a)(1) (1987).
228. Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-47-50) (Supp. 1990); see also ALAsKA STAT. § 47.24.100(8)
(1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.102(12) (West Supp. 1990). Numerous guardianship statutes
also employ similar language. See S. ANDERER, supra note 218, at 7 (discussing variations on
this language contained in guardianship statutes, including the most commonly used language,
which is modelled after the Uniform Probate Code).
229. S. ANDERER, supra note 218, at 7.
230. Comment, supra note 4, at 757. For the author, in this context a subjective interpre-
tation is one in which the party assessing the elder's capacity injects his own personal biases
into the decisionmaking process or bases his decision on normative considerations. These
subjective elements do not measure a particular individual's capacity but rather only probe
whether the elder's behavior is idiosyncratic relative either to the individual assessor's norms
or present societal norms. The author recognizes that no human assessing capacity can
completely divorce himself from these subjective influences and that it is unlikely that a truly
"objective" determination could ever be made. Yet, some models for determining incapacity
do attempt to harness these variables better than others by providing mechanisms and
frameworks that leave less room for individual bias and societal normative judgments to
flourish.
231. NATIONAL PARALEGAL INST., ELDER ABUSE AND NEGLECT: A GUIDE FOR PRACTrnONERS
AND POLICY MAKERs 120 (1981) [hereinafter NATIONAL PARALEGAL INST.J.
232. S. ANDERER, supra note 218, at 7.
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A final means employed to define an elder's capacity under APS
laws includes an assessment of the elder's functional ability to care
for himself. These provisions employ phrases such as "adequately pro-
viding for his own care," 3 "unable to perform or obtain services
which are necessary to maintain physical and mental health, ' 2 4 and
"to the extent the adult cannot effectively manage or apply that in-
dividual's estate to necessary ends."- Unfortunately, as is the case
with many definitions of incapacity that include an evaluation of the
elder's ability to understand and communicate his needs, the func-
tional definitions in APS statutes and guardianship laws also often
include language that expressly injects a subjective element into the
determination of functional ability.26 One author notes that employ-
ing a definition based on functional impairment alone is troubling.
The difficulty with functional statements used alone is that a deficit
in a functional skill need not imply an inability to make decisions.
For example, persons may not be able to feed or dress themselves,
but may be capable of making decisions to ensure that they are fed
and dressed. 7
Another author notes his preference for an assessment of the eld-
er's functional ability to care for himself in lieu of the medical model
to which courts too often resort.23Y Accordingly, the court's inquiry
would focus on functional ability by exploring the potential ward's
behavior through questions including: 'Is he misplacing his Social
Security check?', 'Does he pay his heating bill?', 'Does he care for
his personal needs?', or 'Has he arranged for someone to look after
him?" 2 3 9
The proper composition of the definition of incapacity or in-
competence in both elder abuse related APS provisions and under
guardianship provisions generally is (and should be) the subject of
233. ALA. CODE ANN. § 38-9-2(4) (Supp. 1989).
234. CoN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-14(2) (West 1986).
235. M. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3472(10) (Supp. 1989). California's Probate Code has
a similarly functionally-focused definition which refers to inability to "provide for his or her
personal needs for physical health, food, clothing, or shelter." CAL. PROB. CODE § 1801(a)
(West 1981). Language in many guardianship statutes Aimilarly calls for an assessment of the
proposed ward's functional abilities to care for himself or his property. See S. ANDERER,
supra note 218, at 8-10.
236. See M. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3472(10) (Supp. 1989) ("effectively manage"); S.
ANDERER, supra note 218, at 8 (describing various subjective phrases found in guardianship
provisions).
237. S. ANDERER, supra note 218, at 13 (footnote omitted).
238. Horstman, supra note 100, at 227-28; cf. CoNsEnvAToasmS' REcoMMNDAMONS supra
note 5, at 33-34 (recommending, instead, an assessment of functional capacity measured
through the use of a standard assessment instrument designed for that purpose); NATIONAL
PARALEoAL INsT., supra note 231, at 120.
239. Horstman, supra note 100, at 227 n.55.
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great debate. That clear definitions and comprehension of these terms
are essential, however, is not subject to debate. The stakes-an elder's
right to self-determination and autonomy-are too high to respond
otherwise.
In light of the criticisms levied against the existing definitions, a
more reliable determination of incapacity would include a combination
of factors. The following suggestions are not intended to serve as a
exhaustive list of the essential elements of an incapacity assessment.
Rather, given the criticisms noted above, they offer examples of some
of the basic tenets that should underpin a proper assessment. One as-
pect of the incapacity inquiry should include an objective assessment
of the elder's functional abilities. Furthermore, subsequent imposition
of assistance in the APS or guardianship context (if such assistance
is deemed necessary after this inquiry) would include only the least
restrictive means of assisting the elder given his functional capabilities.
Finally, the assessment must include not only a determination that the
elder is unable to make or communicate decisions regarding his care,
but also that this inability is the result of a demonstrated disorder or
disability.
b. Procedures for Involuntary or Nonconsensual Intervention
Two procedures are used most widely to impose involuntary
services on abuse victims in the nonemergency setting. The majority
of states use the traditional guardianship or conservatorship me-
chanisms that already exist within their probate codes. 24' Others have
established a special procedure within their APS laws that operates
independently of the guardianship or conservatorship sections of the
probate code. 242 For the most part these procedures function in the
same manner as guardianships and conservatorships. Most proceed-
ings result in an order by the court designating an individual, or-
ganization, or agency to act as the functional equivalent of a guardian
or conservator. 24 Some critics argue that substituting these specific
procedures for those in traditional guardianship statutes may provide
insufficient due process protections.2" For this reason the discussion
240. S. ANDERER, supra note 218, at 22.
241. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 39-5304 (1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3482 (Supp.
1989). 1
242. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 38-9-6 (Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.105(3) (West
Supp. 1990); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-47-13 (Supp. 1990).
243. See, e.g., A.A. CODE § 38-9-6(h) (Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.105(3)(b) (West
Supp. 1990); MIss. CODE ANN. § 43-47-13(3) (Supp. 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-6-107(b)(3),
(c) (1987).
244. Regan, Protecting the Elderly: The New Paternalism, 32 HASTINGs L.J. 1111, 1127-
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of involuntary provision of services will focus on imposition of these
services by way of guardianship or conservatorship proceedings. Any
major deviations between the two procedures, however, will be noted.
In the states that use the existing probate system, the APS code
typically directs that in the event an abused elder reasonably appears
to lack capacity to consent, the investigating department seek ap-
pointment of a temporary guardian or conservatorm45 or, in some
states, of a permanent guardian or conservator.2" The guardian or
conservator has the authority to consent to protective services for the
elder victim. A guardian traditionally is appointed to protect and care
for a person and a conservator is appointed to protect and care for
an estate.247 These terms, however, sometimes are used interchange-
ably. Moreover, different states statutorily may employ them dif-
ferently. California, for example, calls an individual appointed to
care for the person of an adult a conservator. 24s
To appoint a guardian the court must declare the individual
"incapacitated," "incompetent," or unable to care for himself.249
28 (1981); see also Kapp, Adult Protective Services: Convincing the Patient to Consent, 11
LAW, MnD. & HEALTH CARE 163 (Sept. 1983). Professor Regan argues that the due process
protections included in much protective services legislation have "serious procedural flaws"
and that "[t]he standards for intervention are still vague and conclusory." Regan, supra, at
1127 (footnotes omitted). He notes that once the court has signed its protective order, the
intervenor (usually a public agency) is "rarely accountable to anyone, including the court
.... " Id. Professor Kapp echoes Regan's concerns, arguing that
rarely do these special statutes require notice of the filing of the petition to the
patient/client, the presence of the patient at the hearing, the person's right to
counsel, or a specific evidentiary standard of proof .... Although a full hearing
is contemplated and available, it frequently becomes the public agency's ex parte
presentation of testimony to a sympathetic court which routinely issues the orders
for protective services precisely as requested by the agency.
Kapp, supra at 235 (footnotes omitted).
245. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.24.030(a) (1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, para. 6609
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990).
246. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-20(a) (West 1986); IDAHo CODE § 39-5304
(1985); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3482 (Supp. 1989).
247. 39 Am. Jua. 2D, Guardian & Ward § 17 (1968) (guardianship defined); UNzw. PRoB.
CODE § 1-201(16) (1969) (guardian defined); id. § 1-201(6) (1969) (conservator defined); 39
AM. JtbR. 2D Guardian & Ward § 22 (1968) (same).
248. CAL. PRoB. CODE § 1800.3 (West Supp. 1990). Since states' uses of the terms
guardianship and conservatorship vary widely, for convenience this Note will use the term
guardianship to refer to both. For a discussion of the California conservatorship system, see
CONSERVATORSHIP RECoMMENDATIONS, supra note 5; Friedman & Savage, supra note 226.
249. Krauskopf & Burnett, The Elderly Person: When Protection Becomes Abuse, Tami,
Dec. 1983, at 60, 61-62; see also Regan, Protective Services for the Elderly: Benefit or Threat,
in ABUSE AND MALTREATMENT OF TEa ELDERLY: CAUSES AND INTERvENIONS 279, 283 (J.
Kosberg ed. 1983) According to Professor Regan, the court should make two findings before
it appoints a guardian: (I) that a person suffers from a condition that affects his mental
capacity and (2) that as a result of this condition, the individual is functionally disabled such
March 1991]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
As discussed above, determinations of "incapacity" or "incompet-
ence" vary depending on the particular state's statutory definition
of these terms. The guardian essentially is authorized to act as the
legal substitute of the ward.2 0 An unlimited guardianship reduces an
elder to the status of a child and can deprive the elder of both per-
sonal rights and civil liberties. 25 1 The rights the ward loses typically
include anything from the ability to structure one's own daily routine
to the rights to contract, make gifts, execute wills, write checks, marry,
and vote.
2 2
Because the consequences of a guardianship or conservatorship
appointment so drastically diminish an individual's rights, compli-
ance with the requirements of due process must be meticulously en-
forced. The fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution
guarantees a proposed ward that he will not be deprived of "life,
liberty or property without due process of law. ' 253 Fundamental to
due process of law is the right to be heard. 25 4 To protect this right
the United States Supreme Court has ruled that an individual must
receive reasonably calculated notice of a pending action and an op-
portunity to present his objections. 255 The notice provisions in guard-
ianship statutes range from forty-eight hours notice to as much as
ten days.256 Yet, few statutes require that the notice explain the se-
that he cannot care for himself or his property. Id. at 251. Regan cautions that courts place
too much emphasis on the first factor and should pay more attention to the functional abilities
of the proposed ward. Id. at 251-52. This problem is similar to that discussed above regarding
the inappropriateness of a medical model for the definition of incapacity. See supra notes 220-
239 and accompanying text. See generally S. ANDERER, supra note 218, at 4-15 (comprehensive
discussion of the statutory standards employed).
250. WORKING PAPER, supra note 54, at 40.
251. Id. at 62.
252. See id. at 39-40; Krauskopf & Burnett, supra note 249, at 61; CONSERVATORSMP
RECOM:ENDATiONS, supra note 5, at 57. Notably, a group of commentators asserts that adult
protective services and guardianship are patently inappropriate under all circumstances and
that the terms "mental incompetency" are misapplied to the elderly in guardianship proceedings.
See Horstman, supra note 100, at 225-30 (discussing the "Abolitionist Model" of guardianship);
see also Mitchell, supra note 100, at 1448. One commentator who espouses this position notes,
"In a society which venerates liberty, conservatorship is an anachronism. Neither the interest
in potential beneficiaries nor the interest of the state in having a better management position
vis-a-vis the ward is justified." Alexander, Who Benefits From Conservatorship?, TRIAL, May
1977, at 30, 32; see also Alexander, Premature Probate: A Different Perspective on Guardi-
anship for the Elderly, 31 STAN. L. Rv. 1003 (1979) [hereinafter Alexander, Premature
Probatel (urging use of living wills in lieu of guardianship as a means of returning the right
to determine what is done with the ward's property and health to the individual to make such
decisions when competent).
253. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 314; see also Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
256. See, e.g., OKIA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 10-108 (West Supp. 1990) (48 hours); UTAH
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rious nature of the pending action 257 or address "the problem of the
confused client who may not appreciate the terms or importance of
the legal document conveying the notice." 25 8 Such an explanation is
essential in this context. Moreover, because there is a possibility that
an elder may not understand the nature or importance of the notice,
guardianship statutes should mandate that the elder's spouse, at-
torney, caretaker, children, or next of kin also be served notice of
the pending hearing.2 9 Furthermore, although not constitutionally
required, some states require that the proposed ward be present at
the hearing, 260 and that an attorney representing the proposed ward
also be present.261 Some states provide for the appointment of coun-
CODE ANN. § 55-19-5(1)(c) (1986) (10 days). California requires that notice of the hearing on
petition for appointment of a conservator be given at least 15 days before the hearing. CAL.
PROB. CODE § 1822(a) (West Supp. 1990). Notice is a jurisdictional'requirement, and if the
requirement is not met the appointment may be void. Grinbaum v. Superior Court, 192 Cal.
528, 540-43, 221 P. 635, 640-41 (1923); In re Guardianship of Peterson, 84 Cal. App. 2d 541,
543, 191 P.2d 98, 99-100 (1948) (both decided under the predecessor statute to California
Probate Code § 1822). In Grinbaum, the court noted that the notice requirement "rests upon
the fundamental doctrine, as old as Magna Carta, that no person can be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law ... ." 192 Cal. at 541, 221 P. at 640. Notice
may not be waived, nor may the court consent to jurisdiction. See In re Guardianship of
Sullivan, 143 Cal. 462, 466-67, 77 P. 153, 154 (1904); In re Guardianship of Walters, 37 Cal.
2d 239, 244, 231 P.2d 473, 476 (1951) (both decided under predecessor to California Probate
Code § 1822).
257. But see N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 473-a5(b)(i) (McKinney 1983) (requires that notice
contain the following language in bold type: "WARNING IF YOU DO NOT APPEAR IN
COURT YOUR LIFE AND LIBERTY MAY BE SERIOUSLY AFFECTED. FOR FREE
INFORMATION CONCERNING YOUR LEGAL RIGHTS CALL OR VISIT.").
California also attempts to indicate the seriousness of the pending court matter in the notice.
The California Probate Code provides that if the petition for appointment of conservator is
filed by someone other than the proposed conservatee, the court clerk must issue a citation
directed to the proposed conservatee. Among the statements included in the notice is the
following: "[s]uch adjudication may affect or transfer to the conservator the proposed
conservatee's right to contract, in whole or in part, to manage and control property, to give
informed consent for medical treatment, and to fix a residence... [and that] [t]he proposed
conservatee may be disqualified from voting ... ." CAL. PROB. CODE § 1823(b)(2)-(3) (West
1981).
258. Regan, supra note 244, at 1118. See generally Horstman, supra note 100, at 237-41
(discussing notice to incompetents).
259. Cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.105 (3) (West Supp. 1990) (provides that notice of filing
petition for guardianship be sent to elder, spouse, attorney, and if known, adult children or
next of kin).
260. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1825(a)(1)-(2) (West 1981). In California, the proposed
conservatee must attend the hearing except if he is out of state when served and is not the
petitioner, or when he is unable to attend due to medical inability. Id. Although this presence
technically is required, most states allow the court to waive the requirement if it is in the best
interest of the proposed conservatee. As such, the hearing in effect becomes an ex parte
proceeding. WoaioN PAPER, supra note 54, at 38; Horstman, supra note 100, at 241-43.
261. Horstman, supra note 100, at 244-45; see WORKING PAPER, supra note 54, at 38;
CONSER VATOESHip RECOMMENDATION, supra note 5, at 33-34; Krauskopf & Burnett, supra note
249, at 61.
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sel or a guardian ad litem, 262 arguably "because of the deprivation
of individual liberty inherent in the nature of guardianship counsel
is essential to guarantee due process in guardianship hearings. '
26
1
A trial by jury is not constitutionally required and in most states
is not statutorily required. 264 Finally, in Addington v. Texas265 the
Supreme Court established that the standard of proof required to
involuntarily commit an individual to a mental hospital is one of
clear and convincing evidence. The Court refused to require proof
beyond a reasonable doubt because of the lack of certainty and fal-
libility of a psychiatric diagnosis and the consequent possibility that
a state might never be able to meet its burden of proof.266 Based on
this reasoning, the Court probably would apply the same standard
to guardianship proceedings.
267
States that dictate procedures in their APS laws also employ a
combination of due process protections. The responsible agency must
petition the court to order protective services. 268 The petition must
allege facts sufficient to show that the elder needs protective services
and that he lacks capacity to consent. 269 Following receipt of the pe-
tition the court is required to set the case for hearing, sometimes
within a given time period. 270 The elder must be afforded notice of
the hearing, usually a stated number of days before the hearing.
27'
The statutes accord the elder any of a combination of the fol-
lowing rights relating to the hearing: the right to be present at the
262. Horstman, supra note 100, at 244-45; see WORKING PAPER, supra note 54, at 38. A
guardian ad litem is an officer of the court who may or may not be a lawyer. He serves to
represent the interests of mental incompetents during the course of litigation. Horstman, supra
note 100, at 244 n.129.
263. Horstman, supra note 100, at 250.
264. WORKING PAPER, supra note 54, at 39. See generally Horstman, supra note 100, at
251 (an equal protection argument can be made to mandate a jury trial for proposed
conservatees). Notably, trials of this sort rarely occur. Regan, supra note 249, at 252.
265. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
266. Id. at 429.
267. See id. at 433.
268. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 38-9-6(a) (Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.105(3) (West
Supp. 1990); MIss. CODE ANN. § 43-47-13(1) (Supp. 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-6-107(b)(1)
(1987).
269. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.105(3) (West Supp. 1990); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-
47-13(1) (Supp. 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-6-107(b)(1) (1987).
270. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.105(3)(a) (West Supp. 1990) (hearing must be within
14 days of filing); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-47-13(2) (Supp. 1990) (same). But see TENN. CODE
ANN. § 71-6-107(b)(1) (1987) (no time period stipulated).
271. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 38-9-6 (Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.105(3)(a) (West
Supp. 1990) (at least five days prior to hearing); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-47-13(2) (Supp. 1990)
(same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-6-107(b)(1) (1987) (at least 10 days prior to hearing).
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hearing,27 2 to be represented by private counsel,273 or to have the court
appoint counsel if he is without representation. 274 Moreover, a few
states stipulate that the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem if the
court determines that the elder lacks the capacity to waive the right
to counsel.275 Notably, a number expressly require the court to find
by clear and convincing evidence that the elder needs protective serv-
ices and lacks capacity to consent.276
Despite the theoretical importance of constitutional guarantees
and statutory privileges, the consensus is that the guardianship pro-
cedures are not effectively protecting prospective wards. Moreover,
since the separate procedures contained within APS laws are essentially
analogous to those found in guardianship statutes, their defects are
similarly problematic. A recent Associated Press investigation of the
nation's guardianship system "found a dangerously burdened and
troubled system that regularly puts elderly lives in the hands of others
with little or no evidence of necessity .... [It also found that guard-
ianship is] a legal tool meant to protect elderly and their property...
[that] sometimes results instead in financial or physical mistreat-
ment. ' 277 The report found that in forty-four percent of the cases the
proposed ward was not represented by counsel; in twenty-five percent
272. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.105(3)(a) (West Supp. 1990); MIss. CODE ANN. § 43-
47-13(2) (Supp. 1990).
273. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.105(3)(a) (West Supp. 1990); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-
47-13(2) (Supp. 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-6-107(b)(2) (1987); cf. ALA. CODE § 38-9-6(a)
(Supp. 1990) (no right to court-appointed counsel but right to appointment of guardian ad
litem).
274. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.105(3)(a) (West Supp. 1990); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-
47-13(2) (Supp. 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-6-107(b)(2) (1987).
275. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-47-13(2) (Supp. 1990); cf. TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-
6-107(b)(2) (1987) (the court shall appoint counsel if the elder lacks capacity to waive this
right).
276. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.105(3)(b) (West Supp. 1990); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-
47-13(3) (Supp. 1990).
277. Bayles & McCartney, Guardianship Systems Often -Victimize Their Wards, L.A. Daily
I., Sept. 25, 1987, at 6, col. 1. This article was one part of an Associated Press six-day series
of special reports collectively entitled "Guardians of the Elderly: An Ailing System." The
series brought to the fore the many problems and abuses inherent in the American guardianship
system and the pressing need for national reform and uniform national standards to protect
elderly wards from abuse. See ABusEs IN GuARDIANsm OF THE ELDERLY AND INFIRM: A
NATIONAL DISORACE, A REPORT BY THE SuBcomm. ON HEALTH AND LONG-TERM CARE OF THE
HousE SELECT Comm. ON AGING, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1987) (citing the
Associated Press articles extensively and endorsing the need for reform); see also Alexander,
Premature Probate, supra note 252, at 1415-19; Rohan, Caring for Persons Under a Disability:
A Critique of the Role of the Conservator and the "Substitution of Judgment Doctrine, " 52
ST. JOHN'S L. Rnv. 1 (1977). A detailed review of procedures used in conservatorship
proceedings and an analysis of whether they satisfy procedural due process requirements is
beyond the scope of this Note.
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of the cases the files indicated there was no hearing held; and in forty-
nine percent of the cases the ward was not present at the hearing. 278
Critics also charge that the use of guardianship with its attendant
infringement on individual liberty is too extreme a solution for most
cases of elder abuse. In evaluating a proposed ward's competency,
courts overemphasize mental capacity and ignore the need to find ev-
idence of functional disability.
279
Ultimately, although guardianship arguably may be appropriate
when an individual clearly is incapacitated and unable to handle all
aspects of daily life, the complete control that characterizes traditional
guardianship is not warranted in cases in which an individual is only
incapable with respect to certain functions. As one author aptly ob-
served,
Many elderly people may need help only with certain recurring events,
such as cashing checks or paying bills, or with certain transactions,
such as selling a house .... They need a flexible guardianship tai-
lored to their individual capacity, one which allows them to retain
control over activities they can perform unaided.8
More limited and flexible guardianship or intervention programs are
better suited for most cases that involve the elderly. 281
Notably, a handful of APS statutes have followed somewhat the
trend toward more limited intervention systems. This is indicated by
specific provisions that require the state to employ the "least restrictive
alternative" when it provides involuntary services. 282 The premise of
the doctrine of the least restrictive alternative is that any substitute
decisionmaking should intrude on individual autonomy only to the
extent necessary in light of the elder's actual impairments and should
place the least possible restrictions on individual liberties and civil
rights.
283
If the least restrictive alternative actually were employed each time
an elder refused consent to services and was found to lack capacity,
it would require the department to conduct an assessment to determine
exactly how capable the elder is, including a careful determination of
278. Bayles & McCartney, supra note 277, at 6, col. 2.
279. This charge is similar to the arguments raised in defining incapacity. See supra notes
209-240 and accompanying text.
280. WORKING PAPER, supra note 54, at 40.
281. Id. I-orstman, supra note 100, at 267; cf. Alexander, Premature Probate, supra note
252 (advocating abolishing guardianship in favor of living will substitutes).
282. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. AtN. § 209.100(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 660.250(5) (Vernon 1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-29-30(2) (Law. Co-op. 1985). The
principle of the least restrictive alternative also has been incorporated into determinations of
incapacity under many state guardianship laws. See S. ANDERER, supra note 218, at 13-14.
283. See NATIONAL PARALEGAL INsT., supra note 231, at 124.
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what activities he remains able to do or decisions he remains able to
make. The department then would tailor an intervention program spe-
cially for that individual to permit the elder to retain maximum au-
tonomy. Inclusion of provisions calling for the least restrictive
alternative in elder abuse laws without simultaneous reform of the
guardianship and conservatorship provisions currently utilized to ef-
fect involuntary intervention is an inadequate solution. The "limited
conservatorship" provisions in the California Probate Code success-
fully implement a least restrictive alternative system by tailoring the
conservatorship process towards this end. The California limited con-
servatorship system, however, specifically was established to be used
when providing protective services for the developmentally disabled
and its provisions do not apply to either the temporary conservator-
ships or permanent conservatorship arrangements imposed on elder
abuse victims in California.3
The California limited conservatorship provision also stipulates
that an assessment of the proposed limited conservatee be conducted,
with the proposed conservatee's consent, at a specially designated re-
gional center. 285 The center is required to submit to the court a written
report with findings and recommendations. Most importantly, "[t]he
report shall include a description of the proposed limited conservatee's
specific areas, nature, and degree of disability, if any.,, 28 6 The report
also must include findings and recommendations that discuss the suit-
ability of the proposed petitioning conservator to meet the needs of
the proposed conservatee.2 7 Recent amendments to the Probate Code
mandate that these reports remain confidential and that they may be
released only to the proposed conservatee, his attorney, the attorney
for the proposed conservator, or the conservator himself if he has no
attorney, and to such other parties as the court orders.2 8
California limited conservatorships for the developmentally dis-
abled allow for needed assistance and protection, but also carefully
284. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1801(d) (West Supp. 1991); see Friedman & Savage, supra note
226, at 287-88. The Act provides that:
limited conservatorships shall be utilized only as necessary to promote and protect
the well-being of the individual, shall be designed to encourage the development of
maximum self-reliance and independence of the individual, and shall be ordered only
to the extent necessitated by the individual's proven mental and adaptive limitations.
CAL. PROB. CODE § 1801(d)(1) (West Supp. 1990).
285. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1827.5(a) (West 1991).
286. Id. The regional assessment center report is made in addition to the report of the
court investigator, who is responsible for filing a report before a hearing on any proposed
conservatorship. Id. § 1826.
287. Id. § 1827.5(a).
288. Id. § 1827.5(c)-(d).
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assess each individual case with the goal of preserving individual rights.
The extension of this flexible, limited conservatorship system into the
area of all adult conservatorship proceedings-including those im-
posing conservatorships in the context of elder abuse cases-would
seem logical since elders, like developmentally disabled adults, not only
deserve to have their cases scrutinized closely but also often do not
require the all-encompassing supervision of a general conservatorship.
Moreover, the establishment of a limited conservatorship system likely
would satisfy, at least to some extent, critics who charge that full con-
servatorship is too extreme a remedy for victims of elder abuse.
To date, none of the principles of the limited conservatorship
have been incorporated into California's temporary or general con-
servatorship schemes, the methods by which conservatorships are im-
posed in the context of adult protective services for victims of elder
abuse. Unfortunately, the legislative efforts in California to extend the
limited conservatorship process to regular conservatorship proceed-
ings, including those that originate as a result of elder abuse, have been
unsuccessful. In 1988 Senator Henry J. Mello introduced a bill pro-
posing to amend the Probate Code to require that the petition form
that is filed to request appointment of a conservator be changed to
require the petitioner to provide information assessing the proposed
conservatee's functional ability. 89 Former Governor George Deuk-
mejian vetoed the bill on September 29, 1988.290 To date, no further
legislative efforts have been made to amend the Probate Code in this
manner.
(10) Emergency Intervention
One common exception to the rule that involuntary services may
be provided only after formal guardianship or guardianship-like pro-
ceedings is the provision of short-term emergency services. Emergency
provisions in APS laws most often constitute an exception to the rule
that services only may be provided with the elder's consent although
some state APS laws exclusively apply to elderly who are in the equiv-
alent of an emergency situation. The New York APS laws, for ex-
ample, only apply to "endangered adults," those individuals who are
in a condition or situation that poses an imminent risk of death or
serious physical harm and who lack the capacity to comprehend the
consequences of remaining in the situation. 291 Emergencies typically
289. S. 2351, 1987-1988 Reg. Sess.
290. Cal. Senate Final History, S. 2351, 1987'1988 Reg. Sess.
291. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 473-al(a) (McKinney 1983).
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are defined as circumstances that "present a substantial risk of death
or immediate and serious physical harm" to the elder. 292 Some states
define an emergency to include a situation that poses a risk of death
or immediate and serious physical harm to the elder or to others.
293
Of particular concern are the definitions, employed by a few states,
that are not limited to circumstances posing a risk of imminent danger
to physical health but also include danger to mental health. 294 It is
highly questionable whether danger to mental health is a legitimate
criteria for emergency intervention. As noted in the discussions re-
garding definitions of incapacity and determinations of incompetency,
an accurate assessment of an individual's mental health is elusive and
susceptible to value-laden subjective determination. 295 More funda-
mentally, definitions of "emergency" are vulnerable to constitutional
attack on the grounds that they are unconstitutionally vague, over-
broad, or both, and that they therefore violate the due process guar-
antees of the fourteenth amendment. 296 In this respect, the inclusion
and careful definition of some element of immediacy or imminence
is essential to any definition of emergency. 297 Although emergency in-
tervention, by definition, is limited mainly to situations in which the
elder is threatened by "imminent" or "immediate" death or great
physical harm, most states do not define "imminent" or "imme-
diate." Such a definition is essential because otherwise the deter-
mination of what constitutes "imminence" or "immediacy" is left
open to subjective interpretation of individual intervening police of-
ficers or social workers-a circumstance that in turn provides an
opportunity for abuse of a mechanism that should be used sparingly
and only when essential. 298 The dictionary defines imminent as "ready
292. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.105(5) (West Supp. 1990); see also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-28-
101(4) (Supp. 1989) (death or severe bodily injury without intervention); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 43-47-5(0 (Supp. 1990).
293. See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 209.020(10) (Michie/Bobbs-MerriU Supp. 1990)
(harm to himself or others); MD. FAm. LAW CODE ANN. § 14-101(e) (Supp. 1989) (same).
Intervention to protect others is justified under the state's police powers. See supra note 104
(discussing police power as compared with parens patriae).
294. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, para. 6602(0 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989) (emergency
defined as a situation with "conditions presenting a risk of death or physical, mental, or
sexual injury."); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 19A, § 14 (West Supp. 1990) (an emergency is
"substantial risk of death or immediate and serious physical or mental harm").
295. See supra notes 212-239 and accompanying text.
296. See Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (vague statute violates
due process protections).
297. This especially is true in those states that provide for intervention with a subsequent
validating hearing because a judge will not review the determination that an emergency exists.
Folice and APS workers must have a clear definition of emergency to determine when emergency
intervention is permitted.
298. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
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to take place" 299 and "immediate" as "near to or related to present
time.''3° The emergency provisions should apply only in circum-
stances in which death or great physical injury to the elder is "ready
to take place" or "near to or related to the present time" and the
definitions employed in these statutes should expressly convey this
meaning.
Arguably inclusion of these definitions does not eliminate the
problem of subjective interpretation; one individual's perception of
whether death is "ready to take place" may vary from another's. The
purpose behind including more comprehensive definitions in this sit-
uation (and in any statute) is not necessarily to eliminate completely
subjectivity, an impossible task especially in this circumstance. Still,
inclusion of an express statement of what is considered "imminent"
or "immediate" serves two important functions. First, as noted earlier
in the context of defining "incapacitated," more comprehensive guide-
lines or definitions at least can work towards establishing a framework
that more effectively restrains individual discretion and subjectivity. 0
Second, especially in those states that allow immediate imposition of
emergency services with a subsequent hearing (as discussed later in this
section), a more exacting definition of emergency, including defini-
tions of imminence or immediacy, is crucial. When an individual is
to be deprived of his right to self-determination (even if only tem-
porarily) without due process and an opportunity to be heard, every
attempt must be made to assure that that intervention is confined to
limited and clearly delineated circumstances.
The definition in the Tennessee Code is an example of a good
starting point for drafting an appropriate definition: imminent danger
of death "means conditions calculated to and capable of producing,
within a relatively short period of time, a reasonably strong probability
of resultant cessation of life if such conditions are not removed or
alleviated.' '302 For inclusion of these more comprehensive definitions
to be meaningful, the police officers, social workers, or other per-
sonnel intervening in these emergency situations should be experienced
and trained in elder abuse emergency intervention and should have
encountered abused elders in numerous and varied abusive situations
so that they are able to recognize circumstances that pose an immediate
threat of death or grave bodily injury.
States generally employ one of two procedures to administer
emergency services. In the majority of states the agency must file a
299. THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 1130 (1976).
300. Id. at 1129.
301. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
302. TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-6-102(4) (1987).
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petition with the court and obtain an emergency court order before
any emergency assistance may be provided. 03 Other state codes permit
emergency assistance to be administered without first obtaining a court
order, but require that a petition be filed to obtain an emergency order
within a mandated brief time period. °4
The procedures for emergency intervention in states that require
an initial court order are similar to those used in proceedings that
impose involuntary services in a nonemergency context, with the ex-
ception that they generally provide fewer due process guarantees. 05
Any measurement of the adequacy of emergency procedures against
the requirements of due process, however, must consider one fun-
damental difference between the two situations. In the emergency con-
text a different balance must be struck between the individual's right
to self-determination and the state's substantial interest in protecting
its citizens from death or grave bodily harm. In an emergency situ-
ation, the procedural due process requirement may be relaxed or may
not apply at all. ° This relaxation, of course, is a sensible and nec-
essary result: in a true emergency that poses a threat of imminent death
or grave bodily harm, intervention after consent is obtained ultimately
may be unnecessary since the endangered individual already may be
irreparably injured or, even worse, dead.
303. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 38-9-5 (Supp. 1990); OKTA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 10-108A
(West Supp. 1990); TEx. HuM. RES. CODE ANN. § 48.061(b) (Vernon 1990); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 63.1-55.6A (1987).
304. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-28-301 (Supp. 1989); FLA. STAT. ANm. § 415.105(5)(b)
(West Supp. 1990); MD. FAM. LAW CODE Ar. § 14-304 (Supp. 1989) (referring to MD. EST.
& TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 13-709(a) (Supp. 1989)); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-47-15(2) (Supp. 1990);
cf. S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1-220 (Law. Co-op. 1989) (law enforcement officer may take adult
in life-threatening situation into custody and transport to place of safety).
305. See supra notes 241-276 and accompanying text.
306. Cf. Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1983); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385
(1978); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978). In these cases the Supreme Court held that
an exception to the constitutional warrant requirement under the fourth amendment exists
under certain emergency circumstances. As Justice Stewart wrote for the Mincey majority,
the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries
and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of
immediate aid ...... "The need to protect or preserve life or to avoid serious injury
is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency."
Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392 (quoting Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1963)).
California courts similarly have recognized this premise. See People v. Hill, 12 Cal. 3d 731,
754, 528 P.2d 1, 19-20, 117 Cal. Rptr. 393, 410-11 (1974); People v. Horack, 3 Cal. 3d 720,
725-26, 478 P.2d 1, 4, 91 Cal. Rptr. 569, 572 (1970); People v. Soldoff, 112 Cal. App. 3d 1,
6-8, 169 Cal. Rptr. 57, 60-61 (1980); People v. Clark, 262 Cal. App. 2d 471, 475-76, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 713, 717 (1968). In Horack the California Supreme Court noted that "[necessity often
justifies an action which would otherwise constitute a trespass, as where the act is prompted
by the motive of preserving life or property and reasonably appears to the actor to be necessary
for that purpose." Horack, 3 Cal. 3d at 725, 478 P.2d at 4, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 572 (quoting
People v. Roberts, 47 Cal. 2d 374, 377, 303 P.2d 721, 723 (1956).
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Most codes require that the APS agency file a petition alleging
that an emergency exists, the adult needs protective services, the in-
dividual is incapable of consenting, and no caretaker or other person
authorized by law, such as a guardian, is available to consent to the
provision of services.10 7 A number of statutes provide that a petition
for emergency services may be filed not only when the elder seemingly
lacks capacity to consent, but also when he "refuses" or "does not
consent."30 These provisions, like those that permit adult protective
services for a capable elder expressly refusing to consent to services
in the nonemergency context, are troubling.3°9 Despite case law that
expressly acknowledges an individual's right to make unreasonable
decisions about his own care, 10 a court may be less likely to question
the constitutionality of providing services without first obtaining con-
sent in a life-threatening emergency.31
Statutes typically require that the elder (or his guardian or care-
taker) receive notice of the scheduled hearing. Usually, notice must
be given a set number of hours before the hearing.112 Some states,
however, waive the notice requirement if reasonable attempts have
been made to notify the adult, the court determines notice would be
impracticable, or there is a showing that delay to satisfy the notice
requirement would result in reasonably foreseeable death or serious
physical harm.3"3 Others do not require notice to the elder, a circum-
stance that essentially transforms the process into an ex parte pro-
ceeding.31 4 The elder usually has the right to be present at the hearing
307. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 38-9-5 (Supp. 1990); TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 48.061(b)
(Vernon 1990).
308. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 38-9-5 (Supp. 1990) ("does not consent"); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 209.100(c) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982) (refuses to consent).
309. See supra notes 212-216 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 111-112 and accompanying text.
311. See supra note 306 and accompanying text. Notably, despite the likelihood that a
court would uphold a time-limited emergency deprivation of a competent elder's right to make
his own decisions regarding his personal care, a lengthy deprivation of this right without an
adversary hearing may violate the elder's liberty rights under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Cf. North Georgia Fishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc. 419 U.S. 601 (1975)
(impounding a bank account without notice or hearing violates due process); Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (revocation of parole involves a loss of liberty that requires pre-
deprivation notice and hearing).
312. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 209.110(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988)
(notice to elder, caretaker, or guardian at least three days before hearing); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43A, § 808(C) (West 1979) (notice to elder at least 48 hours before the hearing); VA. CODE
ANN. § 63.1-55.6 (1987) (notice to elder, spouse, and if none, next of kin at least 24 hours
before the hearing).
313. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 209.110(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982) (court determines
impracticality); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 10-108(C) (West Supp. 1990) (result in physical
harm); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-55.6(D) (1987) (reasonable attempts or result in physical harm).
314. See ALA. CODE § 38-9-5 (Supp. 1990). Alabama provides that any relative or interested
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and the right to private counsel.315 In some states the court will appoint
counsel if the elder cannot afford his own representation or lacks the
capacity to waive his right to counsel.31 6 Some states restrict the per-
missible contents of a court's emergency orders. These provisions of-
ten require court adherence to the doctrine of least restrictive alternative
by ordering only those emergency services necessary to alleviate the
emergency.317 Moreover, many statutes specify whether the court is
empowered to order any of the following measures: hospitalization,
removal from or change of the elder's residence, forcible entry into
the elder's home to administer assistance, and administering of med-
ical treatment.31 8 The statutes commonly stipulate that no person may
be committed to a mental facility under these provisions3 9 and that
the issuance of the order shall not deprive the elder of any rights except
to the extent validly provided for in the order 2.3 20 Finally, most states
provide that the order is effective for a limited time period321 and ac-
cord the elder the right to petition to have the order set aside or mod-
ified. 322
The alternative means for administering emergency services is to
provide the services first and later petition the court for an order that
party may appear to oppose the petition for an emergency order, but does not require that
the elder, or anyone else, be provided with notice of the hearing. Instead, Alabama provides
that the court give notice to the elder, his spouse, and other interested parties within 10 days
after the order is issued. In addition, the notice must divulge the "present whereabouts" of
the elder. Although such an ex parte proceeding may be constitutional under emergency
circumstances, notice of its outcome should be required within a shorter time frame than the
10 day window provided in the Alabama Code, and the elder should be afforded an opportunity
to challenge the court's determination in a subsequent hearing.
315. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-6-107(a)(4) (1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, §
10-108(C) (West Supp. 1990).
316. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 27-7-27A(2) (Supp. 1990) (indigent right to counsel and
independent medical, psychological, or psychiatric examination paid for by state); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 71-6-107(a)(4) (1987) (indigent gets court costs and cost of representation); VA. CODE
ANN. § 63.1-55.6E (1987) (indigent or lacks capacity to waive).
317. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 209.120(2)(a) (Michie/Bobbs-MerrilU 1982); TEx.
Hum. R s. CODE ANN. § 48.061(d) (Vernon 1990).
318. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 10-108(d)(2) (West 1979) (change in residence
only if court specifically finds the action necessary); Tax. Hum. REs. CODE ANN. § 48.061(d)
(Vernon 1990) (removal to other surroundings only as ordered; medical treatment); VA. CODE
ANN. § 63.1-55.6B.2 (1987) (hospitalization; change of residence only as ordered).
319. See, e.g., OKlA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 10-108(D)(2) (West Supp. 1990); VA. CODE
ANN. § 63.1-55.6(B)(2) (1987).
320. See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 209.120(2)(c) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982); VA.
CODE ANN. § 63.1-55.6B.5 (1987).
321. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 27-7-25B.3 (Supp. 1990) (initial order for 10 days
renewable for up to 20 additional days); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 808(D)(3) (West 1979)
(72 hours); Tax. HUM. Rs. CODE ANN. § 48.061(e) (Vernon 1990) (initial 72 hour order may
be renewed twice).
322. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 10-108(E) (West Supp. 1990); TEx. HUM.
Ras. CODE ANN. § 48.061(e) (Vernon 1990).
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acts essentially to validate the intervention. As a general premise, if
adequate safeguards are included to assure the elder's due process rights
and rights to self-determination, this method not only is preferable
to that discussed above, but also is more logical. Emergency inter-
vention, by definition, is limited to situations in which the elder is
threatened by imminent or immediate death or great physical harm.
If emergency intervention is deemed necessary, then waiting for a court
order to be issued before going to the aid of the ailing elder is clearly
an irrational response. The more reasonable and natural response in
these circumstances is to assist the elder in whatever way is necessary
to remove the immediate peril and then, after the danger is abated,
assure that the elder's rights to self-determination are not unduly in-
fringed.
Once a police officer or a representative of the responsible social
services agency has determined that an emergency exists and that the
elder cannot consent, most of these statutes allow the officer or rep-
resentative to take the elder into emergency protective custody and
remove him from the dangerous circumstances. In addition, a few
provisions specify that the elder should be transported to the appro-
priate medical or protective services facility. 33 The Florida statute also
contains a specific provision regarding emergency authorization of
medical treatment.
32A
Once an elder has been taken into emergency custody, most sta-
tutes stipulate that a petition for an emergency order authorizing emer-
gency services be filed with the court.3 25 Typically the petition must
be filed within twenty-four to seventy-two hours after the initial in-
tervention. 326 These time frames appear to be reasonable. After an
initial emergency services order is signed, a few states provide that the
emergency services continue until the imminent danger is abated.
327
Then the department must proceed under the provisions for invol-
untary nonemergency intervention. 328 Other states stipulate that a pre-
323. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-28-301(a)(1) (1987) (emergency protective custody);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.105(5)(b) (West Supp. 1990) (may remove and transport to appropriate
medical or protective services facility); MD. FAm. LAW CODE ANN. § 14-304(b)(2) (Supp. 1989)
(police officer may transport to health facility); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1-220(C) (Law. Co-op.
1989) (law enforcement officer may remove to "place of safety").
324. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.105(5)(c) (West Supp. 1990).
325. See, e.g., FIA. STAT. ANN. § 415.105(5)(b) (West Supp. 1990); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-
47-15(2) (Supp. 1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1-220(E) (Law. Co-op. 1989); cf. ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 5-28-301(a)(2) (1987) (protective custody may not extend longer than 72 hours, at
which time the standard protective services proceedings must be instituted).
326. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.105(5)(b) (West Supp. 1990) (24 hours); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 43-47-15(2) (Supp. 1990) (48 hours).
327. See, e.g., MIss. CODE ANN. § 43-47-15(5) (Supp. 1990).
328. Id.
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liminary hearing be held within forty-eight hours of the initial order
to establish that probable cause exists to continue the emergency serv-
ices . 3
29
If probable cause is established, temporary custody is permitted
to continue, usually for a specified time ranging from four to fourteen
days. 3 0 At the preliminary hearing stage the statutes do not specify
a right to procedural due process. For this reason, the provision that
permits a fourteen-day period of temporary custody without proce-
dural due process protections is suspect, although the four-day period
is less offensive. After the emergency order expires, a hearing with a
variety of procedural protections must be held if the statute either
requires the department to petition for a permanent protective services
order or specifies that a hearing take place.
331
Part II illustrates that devising an APS system to aid victims of
elder abuse requires a meticulously drafted statute that carefully bal-
ances the state's desire to assist citizens who are victims of elder abuse
against the individual elder's rights to self-determination. The over-
view of the APS systems nationwide can serve as a measure by which
to judge the adequacy of California's response to the problem of elder
abuse through its APS legislation. Part III turns to a review of Cal-
ifornia's APS response.
I. Adult Protective Services in California
As discussed in Part I, ten percent of the nation's elderly pop-
ulation resides in California and the number of elderly Californians
has increased dramatically over the past two decades; a rate of increase
that is expected to accelerate. 332 In light of this growth, the problems
of elderly Californians presently must be addressed and will continue
to demand increased attention and resources. The first section below
illustrates that elder abuse is one of these serious problems. The next
section outlines the legislative history of California APS legislation as
applied to victims of elder abuse. This review coupled with the next
329. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-28-301(2)(b) (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.105(5)(e)(1)
(West Supp. 1990).
330. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-28-301(c) (1987)(14 days); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 415.105(5)(e)(2) (West Supp. 1990) (four days). Florida places the following limitations on
the temporary order issued at this stage: implementation of the least restrictive alternative; no
change of residence unless necessary to remove the emergency; and, if removal is necessary,
no transport to a facility for the acutely mentally ill. Id.
331. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.105(5)(f) (West Supp. 1990). The special provision
within the Florida emergency intervention section provides for notice to the elder, his spouse,
guardian, legal counsel, children, and next of kin at least 24 hours before the hearing.
332. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
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section, which describes and assesses the present APS system along
with some recent proposals for amendments, is designed to illustrate
that California's APS legislation is ineffective as applied to victims
of elder abuse. The legislation has failed to evolve since its inception
in the early 1980s, and as a consequence, has not adequately addressed
the multiple and complex issues that must be considered in well-drafted
and thorough APS elder abuse legislation.
A. The Scope of the Problem: Who Are the Victims and the Abusers?
In 1987 there were 12,000 documented reports of elder abuse in
California, a forty-five percent increase over those recorded in 1986.
333
The number of elder abuse referrals to county welfare departments
rose almost sixty-four percent-from approximately 50,000 cases to
over 82,000-from 1983-1984 to 1986-1987.314 With the growth ex-
pected in the population of elderly Californians, 335 this trend is likely
to continue.
In July 1984, pursuant to legislative mandate, the California De-
partment of Social Services conducted a Characteristics Survey of
abused elders in California. The survey was comprised of question-
naires completed by county welfare departments regarding reported
instances of elder abuse . 3 6 The results of the study indicated that the
abused elder typically was a white female, seventy-eight years of age,
337
and that most often the alleged abuser was a white male with an av-
erage age of fifty-one. The abusers usually were family members, most
often spouses or offspring.
3 38
The abuse reported was predominately physical, followed by fi-
duciary, then of neglect, and least often mental. 3 9 In almost half the
333. Dresslar, Programs to Treat, Prosecute "Elder Abuse" Criticized, L.A. Daily J., Nov.
8, 1988, at 1.
334. Id.
335. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
336. Although the survey also included reported instances of dependent adult abuse, a
discussion of these findings is beyond the scope of this Note. Notably, the questionnaire was
not directed toward self-abuse. DEPENDENT ADULT/ELDER ABUSE: CHARACTERISTICS SURVEY,
STUDY MONTH OF JULY 1984, State of California, Health and Welfare Agency, Dep't of Soc.
Services ii (1985) [hereinafter CHRACTERISTICS SURVEY, July 1984].
337. The study showed that 73% of the abused were women, 65.1% were white, 8.8%
hispanic, and 7.5% afro-american. Id. at iii, Profile 3.
338. The study indicated that 46.5% of the abusers were male, and the sex of another
12.1% was unknown. The age of 43.1% of the sample abusers was unknown. Spouses comprised
15.5% and offspring 37.1% of the abusers. Notably, in 23.3% of the cases reported there
was no family relationship between the abuser and the abused; rather "a caretaker, provider,
housekeeper, or landlord type of relationship was identified." Id.
339. See infra notes 418-423 and accompanying text (discussing definitions of various types
of abuse as defined in the California APS law).
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cases more than one type of abuse was present and in a quarter of
the cases the abuse was committed on a daily basis. An overwhelming
amount of the abuse took place in a private residence.3 40 Eighty-five
percent of those abused indicated that they would accept some services
with respect to the abuse, and approximately ninety-four percent of
these received adult protective services from the county welfare de-
partment.
34'
The most recent data collected in California regarding elder abuse
comes from a second Characteristics Survey that was conducted by
the State Department of Social Services in December 1987.342 The find-
ings of this survey are substantially the same as those of the 1984 Char-
acteristics Survey. The abused is typically a white seventy-eight-year-
old female who lives in her own home. 343 The abusers are still pre-
dominately white men with an average age of 48.5 years. Unlike the
1984 finding of predominately physical abuse, this survey indicated
that fiduciary abuse was most prevalent and physical abuse secondary.
The abuse reportedly took place sporadically in more than one-third
of the cases. 344
B. Legislative History
In the early 1980s the California Legislature, like many legisla-
tures nationwide, responded to the newly documented incidence of
elder abuse.3 45 In 1982 and 1983 lawmakers acknowledged that both
dependent adults and elderly persons may be subjected to abuse, ne-
glect, and abandonment and that the state has a responsibility to guard
against such abuse. Consequently, the legislature passed two laws ad-
dressing the issue. The first piece of legislation, Assembly Bill 1805, 34
focused on the dependent adult population. 347 Its provisions encour-
340. Physical abuse was found in 45% of the cases, fiduciary abuse in 41.9%, neglect in
30.3%, and mental abuse in 26.57. Cases of daily abuse comprised 27% of the survey and
86.2% of all reported cases of abuse occurred in a private residence. CHATAcRISTIcs SURVEY,
July 1984, supra note 336, at Table 8.
341. Id.
342. CHAAcTmiusncs SURVEY OF DEPENDENT ADULT ELDER ABUSE VICTIMS, STUDY PERIOD
oF FEn. 15, 1987 THROUGH MARCH 16, 1987, State of California, Health and Welfare Agency,
Dep't of Social Services (1988).
343. The 1988 study, supra, also found that over two-thirds of the victims were disabled.
The survey defined "disability" to include the developmentally, mentally, or physically disabled
as well as the brain-impaired. The majority of those determined to be "disabled" were
physically disabled. Id. at Table 4 ("Disability Status of the Abused").
344. Id. at iv.
345. See generally ELDER ABUsE HousE RbPORT, supra note 16.
346. A.B. 1805, 1981-1982 Reg. Sess. (codified at CAL. WELP. & INST. CODE §§ 15600-
15637 (West 1982)).
347. A dependent adult was defined as any person residing in the state, between the ages
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aged but did not mandate health providers, social service workers, and
community members in general to report suspected cases of abuse of
dependent adults.
3 48
In 1983 the legislature passed Senate Bill 1210, 349 California's first
law directed specifically at elder abuse. The main purpose of the law
was to establish a system for mandatory reporting of instances of elder
abuse. It closely resembled laws enacted in other states immediately
after the House of Representatives Report on Elder Abuse was pub-
lished in 1981. The mandatory reporting provisions set out in this law
formed the basis for the similar mandatory reporting provisions that
remain the predominant feature of California's APS laws today. The
law defined elder abuse as "any one or more of the following acts
which are inflicted by other than accidental means on an elder by an-
other person: physical abuse, fiduciary abuse, neglect, or abandon-
ment. ' 350 Its provisions required an elder care custodian, 35' medical
practitioner, 35 2 nonmedical practitioner, 35 3 or employee of an elder pro-
tective agency 354 to report by telephone and then in writing any sus-
pected instance of physical abuse he observed within the scope of his
employment.3 55 Physical abuse included any willful infliction of cruel
or inhumane corporal punishment or injury by an individual respon-
sible for care or custody of the elder. 56 The statute did not mandate
of 18 and 64, who has physical or mental limitations that restrict his ability to carry out
normal activities or to protect his rights including, but not limited to, persons who have
physical or developmental disabilities or whose physical or mental abilities have diminished
because of age. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610(b)(1) (West 1982).
348. Assembly Bill 238 passed into law in 1985 and mandated the reporting of physical
abuse of dependent adults. A.B. 238, 1985-1986 Reg. Sess. (codified at CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE §§ 15630-15637 (West Supp. 1990)).
349. S. 1210, 1983-1984 Reg. Sess. (codified at CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 9380-9386
(West 1983), repealed by 1986 Cal. Stat. 7691.3).
350. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 9380(b) (West 1984).
351. An elder care custodian could be an administrator of a community care facility
licensed to care for the elderly, a public assistance worker, a probation officer, a social worker,
a licensed home aide, or an employee of an elder care institution, including personnel of
residential care facilities, skilled nursing facilities, and intermediate care facilities. Id. § 9380(g).
352. A medical practitioner was defined as "a physician and surgeon, psychiatrist, psy-
chologist, dentist, osteopath, podiatrist, chiropractor, resident, intern, nurse, pharmacist, or
any other person who is currently licensed under Division 2 (commencing with Section 500)
of the Business and Professions Code." Id. § 9380(h).
353. A nonmedical practitioner could be "a state or county public health employee who
treats an elder for any condition, a paramedic, a coroner, a geriatric or family counselor, or
a lawyer." Id. § 9380(i).
354. An elder protective agency was defined as "the State department of Social Services,
a county probation department, a county welfare department, a police or sheriff's department,
or a nursing home ombudsman." Id. § 9380().
355. Id. § 9381(a).
356. Id. § 9380(c). "Physical abuse includes, but is not limited to, direct beatings, sexual
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reporting of fiduciary abuse,357 neglect, 358 or abandonment; 3 9 any per-
son reasonably suspecting the occurrence of any of these, however,
was encouraged to report it.360 Mandated reporters also were urged
to report any known or suspected instances of mental suffering or
danger to the emotional well-being of an elder, although descriptions
of what constitutes either of these conditions were omitted from the
text of the statute. 361 The statute also expressly abrogated the phy-
sician-patient and psychotherapist-patient privileges362 and provided
that a required reporter always was immune from both civil and crim-
inal liability.363 Any other reporter also was immune unless the report
was made falsely and the reporter knew or should have known it was
false.3 6 A mandatory reporter who knowingly failed to make a re-
quired report was guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of
up to $1000.365
Finally, the law stipulated that elder protective services could
not be provided without the consent of the elder abuse victim unless
a violation of the Penal Code was alleged 366 or the victim was de-
termined to be so incapacitated that he could not legally give or
deny consent, in which case a petition for temporary conserva-
torship or guardianship 367 could be initiated under the Probate
assault, unreasonable physical constraint, or prolonged deprivation of food or water." Id.
Notably, the definitions of abuse employed in Assembly Bill 1805 were the same as those used
in Senate Bill 1210.
357. Fiduciary abuse included instances when any person in a position of trust with respect
to the elder willfully steals, secrets, or appropriates the elder's property or money for uses
outside the scope of that trust. Id. § 9380(d).
358. Neglect was defined as "the negligent failure of any person having the care or custody
of an elder to exercise that degree of care which a reasonable person in a like position would
exercise." Neglect included but was not limited to failure to assist in personal hygiene or in
feeding and clothing; failure to provide medical care for physical or mental health needs;
failure to protect from health and safety hazards; and failure to prevent malnutrition. Id.
§ 9380(e).
359. Abandonment was defined as "desertion or willful forsaking of an elder person by
any person having the care or custody of that elder under circumstances in which a reasonable
person would continue to provide care or custody." Id. § 9380(0.
360. Id. § 9381(b). Reasonable suspicion under this section is gauged by an objectively
reasonable standard. Id.
361. Id. § 9381(c).
362. Id. § 9382(e).
363. Id. § 9385.
364. Id.
365. Id. § 9386.
366. Id. § 9383(b).
367. A temporary conservator or guardian is appointed in urgent situations pending the
final determination of the court on a petition for the appointment of the actual guardian or
conservator. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2250(b) (West Supp. 1990). A temporary conservatorship or
guardianship is limited in duration to no longer than 30 days subject to adjustment by the
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Code.16 1 Of particular interest is the fact that the statute failed to
set out a definition of the term "incapacitated. 3 69
The next major development in the evolution of California's APS
laws came in 1985 when Senate Bill 129370 established the Adult Pro-
tective Services Demonstration Project. The bill provided that the State
Department of Social Services select at least five counties in which to
operate model projects designed to provide various adult protective
services. The projects were implemented to "try new approaches to
reform the existing Adult Protective Services system on a limited basis
for a limited time with the goal of collecting data on the most effective
and cost-efficient models for protecting ... elders and keeping them
as independent as possible." ' 371 The law required the model projects
to include the following components: twenty-four-hour access to APS,
investigation of reports of abuse, assessment of the client's need for
services, assurance that services are received, crisis intervention, co-
ordination with existing community resources, and programs for pre-
vention of elder abuse. 372
In 1985 the legislature also passed Assembly Bill 57,373 which es-
tablished the Emergency Shelters for Elderly and Dependent Adult
Abuse Victims Project. The bill required the State Department of So-
cial Services to develop a program for the establishment of temporary
emergency shelters and provision for counseling at the shelters for
elderly (and dependent) adults who are victims of abuse, neglect, or
abandonment. 374 The law stipulated that the program be implemented
on a pilot project basis in at least six counties. 375
court. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 2257 (West 1981). A temporary guardian or conservator
has limited powers and duties as compared with those of a regular guardian or conservator.
Id. §§ 2252-2253.
368. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 9383(c) (West 1984), repealed by 1986 Cal. Stat. 7631.3.
369. See supra notes 209-239 and accompanying text (discussion of the perils inherent in
leaving "lack of capacity" undefined or poorly defined).
370. S. 129, 1985-1986 Reg. Sess. (codified at CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 15710-15745),
repealed Jan. 1, 1990 by 1987 Cal. Stat. ch. 1166, § 4.
371. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15710(e) (West Supp. 1990). The legislature acknowledged
that the existing APS system was inadequate and also cited other problems with the then
existing APS system including lack of the following: statewide standards for investigation,
early intervention resources to assist caretakers, and structured, timely decisionmaking. Id.
372. Id. § 15721(e).
373. A.B. 57, 1985-1986 Reg. Sess. (codified at CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 13500-13505,
renumbered Chapter 5.5 and amended by 1987 Cal. Stat. ch. 56, § 187, repealed Jan. 1, 1989
by its own terms).
374. Id. § 13500.
375. Id. § 13501. The law permitted the counties participating to contract with non profit
organizations and private sector entities for the rendering of services under the pilot project
in that county. Id. § 13503.5.
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In December 1988, pursuant to legislative mandate, the Depart-
ment of Social Services reported the findings of both model projects
to the legislature. Its report recommended numerous changes aimed
at fashioning "a statewide APS program which serves not only as a
mechanism for reporting adult abuse, but also provides a service sys-
tem responsive to the protective needs experienced by many elder...
adults. '3 76 One recommendation was the establishment of a twenty-
four-hour, seven-day-a-week, toll-free crisis line or emergency tele-
phone number within the county.377 Some counties also suggested that
a twenty-four-hour in-person response system be implemented through
an on-call system. 378 The latter recommendation was based on the
opinion that "emergency response is essential and similar in concept
to a fire department-the use of the service is unpredictable, but vital
to the victim when needed. ' 379 The report also recommended that APS
agencies would be the appropriate agencies to investigate reports of
abuse in a statewide system 380 and that appropriate initial response
times for these investigations would range from "immediately" to ten
days depending on the emergency nature of the report. 381 Furthermore,
the report recommended encouragement of joint investigations with
agencies including, among others, local law enforcement and mental
and public health programs. 382 These investigations would include con-
tacts with family and other relevant persons and, if feasible, an in-
terview with the alleged abuser.
383
The report also suggested that a "needs assessment," designed
to identify the elder's specific protective service needs, be a mandatory
component of a statewide system and that it be standardized. 384 The
needs assessment document would provide for an evaluation of the
elder's physical, emotional, and mental functioning; economic and
environmental factors; support systems and coping skills; factors pre-
cipitating the current situation; collateral contacts; and pertinent serv-
376. REPORT TO THE LEGSsLATURE: EVALUATION OF THE ADULT PROTaCnrvE SERvicEs AND
ELDER/DEPENDENT ADULT EMERGENCY SHELTER DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS, State of California,
Health and Welfare Agency, Dep't of Social Services 53 (1988) [hereinafter REPORT TO THE
LEGisMATur ].
377. Id. at 16-19. The recommendation noted the system could include use of an answering
service after hours or on weekends and holidays. Id. at 18.
378. Id. at 16-17.
379. Id. at 17.
380. Id. at 23. This responsibility would be for investigations of reports of abuse occurring




384. Id. at 24-26.
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ice history. The development of a standardized mental competency
tool also was recommended. 85
Assurance of services, to be implemented by way of a service plan,
also was suggested as a provision to be incorporated as part of any
statewide APS system . 86 A service plan is a written document prepared
by a social worker that outlines the elder's service needs and delegates
responsibility for each service.18 7 The report also recommended the
establishment of a time-limited intervention system, a form of tem-
porary intervention aimed at preventing or alleviating circumstances
that pose a threat to the elder. 88 Based on its experience with the model
project, the Department of Social Services advocated establishing a
system of emergency shelters that offer a range of care levels suited
to individual elder needs. 8 9 Additional recommendations included the
development of community education programs to raise public aware-
ness and understanding about elder abuse39° and APS coordination
with existing community resources.3 91 Finally, the report noted that the
Department of Social Services "endorses the concept of a statewide
automated system to capture APS case data and has included the stan-
dardization of pertinent case processing forms throughout [the] report
to facilitate the future development of such a system." 392 Unfortu-
nately, to date no legislation has been passed incorporating any of
these recommendations into California's existing APS laws.
By 1986 mandatory reporting provisions were the mainstay of the
California APS system and the model projects were underway. In Sep-
385. Id. at 26.
386. Id. at 27-36.
387. See generally id. The following services were among those discussed in the recom-
mendation: counseling, case management, advocacy, referral to a medical-mental health center,
in-home care, out-of-home care, transportation, money management-representative payee as-
sistance, conservatorship referral, legal services, and emergency food. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id. Among the recommendations was the suggestion that motels or hotels could be
used for elders who do not require supervision, board and care facilities for individuals that
require 24-hour supervision, and skilled nursing facilities for any persons who need medical
care. Id. at 41.
390. Id. at 45.
391. Id. at 49-52.
392. Id. at ii. Also in 1985, Assembly Bill 1603 required the State Department of Social
Services, in consultation with representatives from county government and other designated
entities, to establish minimum guidelines for county adult protective service agencies to
determine when an investigation of an allegation of elder abuse is warranted. It mandated that
the Department of Justice develop uniform guidelines for local law enforcement assistance
with investigation of allegations of elder abuse. A.B. 1603, 1985-1986 Reg. Sess. (codified at
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15640(a) & (b) (West Supp. 1990)). For more information on
these reports, see generally MINiUUm GUIDELINES FOR COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENTS: DE-
PENDENT AND ELDER ABUSE INVESTIGATIONS, STATE DEP'T OF SOCIAL SERVICES (1986) (amend-
ments); GUIDELINES FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF ELDER AND DEPENDENT ADULT ABUSE, DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, STATE OF CAL. (1988).
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tember 1986 Assembly Bill 3988393 became law, consolidating and clar-
ifying elder and dependent adult abuse reporting laws, requirements,
and definitions. The bill repealed the provisions originally set out by
Senate Bill 1210 on elder abuse reporting and amended the sections
of Assembly Bill 238 that established mandatory reporting of de-
pendent adult abuse. In their place it created a combined program that
contained reporting requirements for both abused elders and depend-
ent adults. 394 The law clarified the roles of adult protective services,
law enforcement agencies, and the long-term care ombudsman395 pro-
grams in handling reports of abuse. It also provided protections for
mandated reporters, including confidentiality of reports and immunity
from liability resulting from a report.39 It added misdemeanor pen-
alties for those mandated reporters who failed to report instances of
abuse when the circumstances required them to do so.
3
9
With the exception of a number of smaller amendments to the
APS legislation these developments constitute the bulk of the changes
that have produced California's present APS legislation. In addition
to these, however, a few proposed yet unsuccessful amendments to
the APS laws are worthy of note. Senate Bills 2544398 and 254539 were
substantially similar and were introduced by Senator Rosenthal in Feb-
ruary 1988.4 Both would have required each county to establish a
393. A.B. 3988, 1984-1986 Reg. Sess. (amending CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 15600-
15601, 15610, 15620, 15630-35, 15640 (West Supp. 1990)).
394. Id.
395. The Office of the Ombudsman is the primary agency responsible for receiving and
investigating reports of alleged abuse of elders who are residents of long-term care facilities.
For the purposes of this Note examination of California APS is confined to legislation as it
relates to abuse, neglect, and exploitation of elderly persons in domestic or noninstitutional
settings. For further information regarding the role of the Ombudsman, see CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE §§ 9701-9740 (West Supp. 1990).
396. CAL. WEF. & INsT. CODE §§ 15633.5-15634 (West Supp. 1990).
397. Id. § 15634(d). In addition to these particular changes to the APS laws, two other
provisions passed in Assembly Bill 3988 relate to elder abuse although their resting place is
not in the Welfare and Institutions Code with the APS provisions. One section amended the
California Evidence Code section that affords the spousal privilege not to testify against one's
spouse or to disclose a confidential communication. CAL. Evm. CODE § 972 (West Supp.
1990). The amendment made the privilege inapplicable in criminal proceedings in which one
spouse is charged with a crime against the person or property of the other spouse, or of a
child, parent, relative, or other cohabitant. Id. § 972(e)(1). This amendment clearly is helpful
to California's victims of elder abuse since statistics indicate family members are among the
prime abusers. The other provision amended a portion of the Penal Code to make it a crime
to inflict unjustifiable pain or mental suffering on an elder or for the person having custody
and control of a dependent adult to steal or embezzle the elder's property. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 368 (West Supp. 1989).
398. S. 2544, 1988-1989 Reg. Sess. [hereinafter S. 2544].
399. S. 2545, 1988-1989 Reg. Sess. [hereinafter S. 2545].
400. The primary difference between the two bills was in the funds appropriated to
effectuate their provisions. Senate Bill 2545 would have appropriated $15 million from the
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twenty-four-hour response system to protect elders who are in im-
mediate danger of physical harm and exploitation40 The system would
provide in-person or telephone response seven-days-a-week. 402 The bills
also would have mandated minimum emergency services including in-
formation and referral services to assist elders in receiving community
resources, counseling to stabilize the family situation, emergency
transportation to a safe environment, emergency shelter, in-home care,
and short-term case management. 403 Both bills also mandated that
county welfare departments respond immediately to any report of im-
minent physical danger to an elder residing in other than a long-term
care facility. 4 The proposed bills contained a few sections that are
especially notable. The bills proposed that the social worker attempt
to obtain consent to enter and attempt to meet privately with the elder,
with a caregiver, attendant, or family member present only if re-
quested by the elder. 405 Moreover, one section provided that "[i] f there
is probable cause to believe that a felony ... has occurred and a county
social worker has been denied entry to meet privately with the [elder]
... , the county social worker may request that the local law en-
forcement agency seek a search warrant.'"' Senate Bill 2545 emerged
from Committee on November 30, 1988, but unfortunately, the leg-
islature took no further action on it. Senate Bill 2544 was vetoed by
former California Governor George Deukmejian on September 28,
1988. 407 Notably, both bills were proposed before the Department of
General Fund to the Department of Social Services to cover state and county costs of the
expanded emergency response program. See id. § 6(a) & (b). It was expected that General
Fund costs of $175,000 in 1988-1989 (half-year) and approximately $350,000 in subsequent
years would be required for the Department of Social Services to administer the emergency
response system. See Analysis of Senate Bill No. 2545, Legislative Analyst, May 19, 1988 (on
file at THm HAsmI-Gs LAW JouRNAL) [hereinafter Legislative Analysis]. The analysis also
projected that the mandated local program would cost at least $8.5 million in 1988-1989 (half-
year) and at least $17 million annually in subsequent years to administer the emergency response
program and provide services to victims of abuse. All these costs would be subject to state
reimbursement. Id.
Senate Bill No. 2544 required no direct appropriation from the General Fund. Rather, the
bill provided for each county welfare department to develop and transmit to the Department
of Social Services a plan and budget identifying the elderly population in need of services and
the monies they would require to implement the mandated project. S. 2544, supra note 398,
§ 6(c)(1). The bill provided that if the Department of Social Services did not reply to the
county's request within 30 days the plan was to be deemed approved. Alternatively, the
Department was empowered by the provisions to deny the plan and the funding. Id. § (6)(c)(2).
401. Id. § 4(a); S. 2545, supra note 399, § 3(a).
402. S. 2544, supra note 398, § 5(a); S. 2545, supra note 399, § 4(a).
403. S. 2544, supra note 398, § 5(a); S. 2545, supra note 399, § 4(a).
404. S. 2544, supra note 398, § 5(b); S. 2545, supra note 399, § 4(b).
405. S. 2544, supra note 398, § 3(a); S. 2545, supra note 399, § 2(a).
406. S. 2544, supra note 398, § 3(b); S. 2545, supra note 399, § 2(b).
407. See Governor's Office, Press Release on Veto of Senate Bill No. 2544 (Sept. 29,
1988).
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Social Services reported back to the legislature with its findings re-
garding the model projects. In vetoing Senate Bill 2544 the Governor
stated that he believed it was important "to examine the results of the
... [pilot projects] prior to implementing the statewide requirements
of adult protective services specified in this bill and expanding its
costs."'' 4 8 He did not cite any major problems, however, with the sub-
stance of the proposed law.
One other major APS bill, Senate Bill 84,409 was passed by the
legislature in 1988 and subsequently vetoed by the Governor in Oc-
tober 1989.410 This bill would have made essentially the same changes
as Senate Bills 2544 and 2545 proposed.41' Although the adult pro-
tective services model pilot program was not scheduled to be com-
pleted until January 1, 1990, the Department of Social Services Report
to the legislature on the projects already had been released as of March
1989 when this bill went to the Governor for his signature. Despite
his earlier assertion that he was waiting for the report on the model
pilot program before signing into law a statewide APS system, the
Governor, with the report already published, vetoed this bill as well.
This time he cited budgetary concerns as the reason for his veto and
concluded that the merits of the legislation did not sufficiently out-
weigh the need to fund "top priority programs," although he failed
to detail what these programs were.41 2
Finally, there is one major piece of APS legislation currently
pending in the Senate, Senate Bill 1047. 411 This bill essentially seeks
to implement the recommendations made by the Department of Social
Services in its Report to the legislature regarding the model projects.
Absent, however, are the specific provisions included in both Senate
Bill 2544 and Senate Bill 84 regarding access to the victim and ap-
plication for a warrant if necessary.414 Whether this bill will pass through
the legislature is as yet unknown and perhaps even more questionable
is whether the newly elected Governor Pete Wilson will continue with
former Governor Deukmajian's funding of other "top priority pro-
grams." That Governor Wilson will be inclined toward allocating ad-
ditional funds to APS is highly questionable in light of the dire financial
408. Id.
409. S. 84, 1988-1989 Reg. Sess. [hereinafter S. 84].
410. See Governor's Office, Press Release on Veto of Senate Bill No. 84 (Oct. 2, 1989).
411. Not surprisingly, with the legislature having groped for financing for these earlier
programs, the major difference between Senate Bill 84 and bills 2544 and 2545 was the
financing for the proposed programs. Among other fiscal provisions, the bill appropriated
$7.2 million from the General Fund. See S. 84, supra note 409, § 6; see also id. §§ 5(a), 7-9.
412. See Press Release, supra note 410.
413. S. 1047, 1989-1990 Reg. Sess. [hereinafter S. 1047].
414. See S. 2544, supra note 398, § 3.
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status of the state's budget and the dirth of federal assistance.
C. California Adult Protective Services Laws Today
The current APS law in California remains predominately a man-
datory reporting law that applies to both elders and dependent adults.
41 5
The declared purposes of the statute are threefold: to encourage re-
porting of suspected cases of abuse; to collect information on the num-
bers of victims, the circumstances surrounding the abuse, and any other
data that would assist in establishing adequate services for the victims;
and to provide protection for all individuals making bona fide reports
of abuse. 4 6 Although part of the declared intent of the legislature is
to take such actions as are necessary to protect the elder, correct the
situation, and ensure the individual's safety, 4 17 the law undeniably is
focused on handling reports from mandated reporters rather than on
what should be done once a report is received.
The statute defines abuse of an elder as physical abuse, 418 ne-
glect, 41 9 intimidation, cruel punishment, fiduciary abuse, 420 abandon-
ment,42' other treatment resulting in physical harm or pain or mental
415. CpAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 15600(h), 15610(a) (West 1991). The Code defines an
elder as "any person residing in this state, 65 years of age or older," id. § 15610(a), and a
dependent adult as "any person residing in this state, between the ages of 18 and 64, who
has physical or mental limitations which restrict his or her ability to carry out normal activities
or to protect his or her rights including, but not limited to, persons who have physical or
developmental disabilities or whose physical or mental abilities have diminished because of
age." Id. § 15610(b)(1). The definition of dependent adult also includes "any person between
the ages of 18 and 64 who is admitted as an inpatient to a 24-hour health facility, as defined
in Sections 1250, 1250.2, and 1250.3 of the Health and Safety Code." Id. § 15610(b)(2).
416. Id. § 15601.
417. Id. § 15600(h).
418. Physical abuse includes assault, battery, assault with a deadly weapon or force likely
to produce great bodily injury, and sexual assault as defined in the California Penal Code. It
also includes unreasonable physical constraint; prolonged deprivation of food or water; and
the use of physical or chemical restraint, medication, or isolation, other than as ordered, for
the purpose of staff convenience, punishment, or for a longer time period than ordered. Id.
§ 15610(c)(1)-(6).
419. Neglect is defined as the failure of a person having care or custody of an elder adult
to exercise the degree of care that a reasonable person in a similar position would exercise.
Id. § 15610(d). Neglect includes, but is not limited to, failure to assist in personal hygiene;
failure to provide food, clothing, shelter, medical care or for mental health needs; failure to
protect from health and safety hazards; and failure to prevent malnutrition. Id. § 15610(d)(1)-
(4).
420. Fiduciary abuse occurs when a person who has care or custody of the elder, or is in
a position of trust to the elder takes, secretes, or appropriates money or property for purposes
not in the due and lawful execution of that trust. Id. § 15610(f).
421. Abandonment is the desertion or willful forsaking of an elder by a custodian or
caretaker under circumstances in which a reasonable person would not discontinue care. Id.
§ 15610(e).
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suffering, or deprivation by a care custodian4  of goods or services
that are necessary to avoid physical harm or mental suffering. 42 Its
provisions mandate reporting of suspected or known instances of phys-
ical abuse42 by any care custodian, health practitioner, 42 or employee
of a county adult protective services agency 426 or local law enforcement
agency. The individual is required to telephone the county adult pro-
tective services agency or local law enforcement agency as soon as
possible to report any known or suspected instances of physical abuse. 42
7
The initial telephone contact is to be followed up within two days by
a written report. 42 Reporting of other types of known or suspected
abuse is optional.429 The code also provides that any other person who
reasonably suspects that an elder is the victim of abuse may report
it to the county adult protective services agency. 430
All reports of abuse are confidential and may not be disclosed
to anyone other than specific classes of individuals for investigatory
purposes. 43' The reporter is immune from civil and criminal liability
that may arise as a result of the report, unless it is proven that the
report was false and the reporter knew of its falsity.432 Failure to report
an instance of abuse, however, is a misdemeanor punishable by up
to six months in jail, a fine of up to $1000, or both.433 The law also
provides that as a prerequisite for employment as a care custodian,
health practitioner, or employee with an adult protective services agency
or local law enforcement agency, an individual must sign a statement,
422. The Code defines a care custodian as an administrator or an employee who works
directly with elders as part of his official duties at any one of an extensive list of public and
private facilities that provide care for elders. Id. § 15610(h)(1)-(17).
423. Id. § 15610(g).
424. Id. § 15630(a).
425. Id. § 15610(i).
426. An adult protective services agency is defined as a county welfare department comprised
of individuals who work with elders as part of their official duties, including support staff
and maintenance staff. Id. § 15610().
427. Id. § 15630(a). Telephone reports shall include the name of the person reporting; the
name, age, and present location of the elder; names and addresses of family or others
responsible for the elder's care; the nature and extent of the elder's condition, if known; the
date of the incident; and any other information including what led the reporter to suspect the
abuse. Written reports are to be submitted on forms adopted by the Department of Social
Services. Id. §§ 15630(a)(2), 15633(a)-(b).
428. Id. § 15630(a).
429. Id. § 15630(b).
430. Id. § 15631(a). Reasonable suspicion under this section is gauged by an objectively
reasonable standard. Id. § 15631(b).
431. Id. § 15633.5. Any violation of these confidentiality provisions is a misdemeanor
punishable by not more than six months in jail, by a fine of $500, or by both. Id.
432. Id. § 15634(a)-(b).
433. Id. § 15634(d).
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on a form provided and to be kept by the prospective employer, that
he has knowledge of the provisions of the code requiring reporting
of abuse and that he will comply with the provisions.
434
Guidelines for investigating reported instances of abuse and pro-
viding services to abused elderly are outlined in the APS codes. In-
vestigation of reported abuse is the responsibility of the county APS
agency and the local law enforcement agency with jurisdiction, except
in instances of physical and fiduciary abuse, in which case the in-
vestigation is the responsibility of the local law enforcement agency.
435
In reported cases of physical abuse, the APS agency is required to
report the case immediately or as soon as practicable to the local law
enforcement agency with jurisdiction over the case. For all other types
of abuse only a written report within two working days is required.
43 6
Each county APS agency is required to maintain an inventory of
all public and private service agencies available to assist victims of
abuse. 437 The inventory is to be used when the agency cannot fulfill
the immediate needs of the victim or to serve the victim on a long-term
follow-up basis. 4 8 County APS agencies are required to file a monthly
report to the State Department of Social Services detailing the reports
of abuse received under these provisions.
43 9
The code provides that an elder at any time may refuse or with-
draw consent to either an investigation or to the provision of protective
services.44° The county APS agencies are prohibited from acting with-
out the alleged abuse victim's consent unless a violation of the Penal
Code has been alleged. 441 If, however, an elder "is so incapacitated
that he or she cannot legally give or deny consent to protective serv-
ices, a petition for temporary conservatorship ... may be initiated
in accordance with Section 2250 of the Probate Code." 442 A definition
of the phrase "so incapacitated that he or she cannot consent" is con-
434. Id. § 15632(a).
435. Id. § 15635(a). The code also provides that the Ombudsman coordinator or county
APS agency should receive any reports of abuse that occur in a long-term care facility, unless
the conduct involves criminal activity, in which case, it immediately should be reported to the
local law enforcement agency. Id. § 15630(b). Moreover, if county APS, local law enforcement,
or the Ombudsman determine that the abuse likely is being perpetrated by a health practitioner
licensed under Division 2 (commencing with § 500) of the Business and Professions Code,
they immediately shall report the information to the agency and it then shall investigate. Id.
§ 15630(e)(2).
436. Id. § 15630(a)(1).
437. Id. § 15635(b).
438. Id. The stated legislative intent here was to recognize that limited funds are available
to resolve suspected cases of abuse.
439. Id. § 156300).
440. Id. § 15650(a).
441. Id.
442. Id. § 15650(b) (emphasis added).
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spicuously absent from the list of definitions included in the code.
Under the California Probate Code, a conservator is to be "ap-
pointed for a person who is unable properly to provide for his or her
personal needs for physical health, food, clothing, or shelter." 443 A
temporary conservatorship typically is instituted in urgent situations
and is limited in duration to thirty days, subject to adjustment by the
court.4" Upon the filing of a petition for a temporary conservatorship,
notice of the proposed appointment must be personally delivered to
the prospective ward unless the court, for good cause, orders oth-
erwise.445 The code also provides that the appointment may be made
with or without notice to other persons as the court may require. 446
Although a temporary conservator has only limited powers and duties
as compared with a regular conservator,447 the use of this temporary
arrangement in the context of elder abuse is disturbing because it is
designed expressly to act as a weigh station en route to imposition of
a full conservatorship. The statute expressly provides that a temporary
conservator is specifically appointed "to serve pending the final de-
termination of the court upon the petition for the appointment of the
[actual] ... conservator.' '44 Institution of these proceedings is the
only means by which the APS agency may either conduct an inves-
tigation or provide services when an elder refuses to consent. And,
as has been discussed, guardianship has been criticized as an extreme
and inappropriate response to the needs of abused elders.449
IV. Some Proposed Changes for California
A brief review of the provisions employed by other states in their
handling of elder abuse through APS legislation calls into question
the vitality of the APS laws in California. In the early 1980s, man-
datory reporting provisions were popular and California, like so many
states, quickly responded by passing a mandatory reporting law that
currently remains the heart, and body for that matter, of the Cali-
fornia APS system. As we near the ten-year anniversary of the "dis-
covery" of elder abuse it is time to reevaluate the adequacy of this
California law. The following are several proposed changes and ad-
ditions that would help to bring California more in step with other
states nationwide and offer a superior system for provision of pro-
tective services.
443. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1801(a) (West Supp. 1990).
444. Id. § 2257 (2) & (2)(b) (West 1981).
445. Id. § 2250(c).
446. Id.
447. Id. §§ 2252-2253.
448. Id. § 2250(b) (emphasis added).
449. See supra notes 250-252 and accompanying text.
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A. Provision of Nonemergency Involuntary or Nonconsensual Services
Under the existing law the only way services may be imposed on
a nonconsenting elder is by the appointment of a temporary conser-
vator under the Probate Code. This action inevitably leads to the ap-
pointment of a regular conservator and, ultimately, to the stripping
of the elder of the majority of his rights to self-determination. The
extreme nature of a conservatorship is not necessary or appropriate
in the vast majority of elder abuse cases. 450 A better system would
include two separate provisions within the present APS laws: one for
nonconsensual emergency intervention and the other for nonemer-
gency intervention without consent. The latter system would be a lim-
ited conservatorship arrangement modelled after the already existing
limited conservatorship system used in California for the develop-
mentally disabled.4 1 The goal of such a system would be to allow
abused elders to function with a maximum of independence, but also
to receive the assistance they require. Like the limited conservatorship
system already in place, these provisions would stipulate that a detailed
assessment of the elder's mental, physical, psychological, and func-
tional capabilities be conducted.
Although this recommendation could be implemented by amend-
ing the sections in the Probate Code regarding conservatorships, such
an amendment seems unlikely in light of the former Governor Deuk-
majian's veto of Senate Bill 2351, which proposed similar, yet less
drastic measures.4 12 There remains, of course, the possibility that Gov-
ernor Wilson would be more open to such a change. Consequently,
a better approach would be to establish specific provisions within the
existing APS laws that would allow for the county welfare agency to
petition the court for a limited and individually tailored order im-
posing services on the unwilling, incapacitated elder. Such a provision
would mandate the full panoply of procedural due process protections,
including a hearing and notice to the party, his spouse, attorney, chil-
dren, and next of kin. Notice should be given at least forty-eight hours
before the hearing and should be specially drafted and printed to ap-
prise fully the elderly individual of the gravity of the proceeding and
assure his understanding of the consequences of a limited conserva-
torship. Moreover, the elder's rights at the hearing should be guarded
carefully and should include the right to be present at the hearing, the
right to legal representation (his own or appointed if he is indigent),
the right to present evidence, and the right to examine and cross-ex-
450. See supra notes 277-290 and accompanying text.
451. See supra notes 284-290 and accompanying text.
452. See supra notes 289-290 and accompanying text.
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amine witnesses. The order would be of limited duration and the law
would stipulate not only that the elder has the right to appeal the order
immediately, but that the court review the order within a mandated
time period to assure that the services being provided are still necessary
or adequate.
B. Defining "Incapacity"
Another concern raised by provisions imposing services on an el-
der who does not consent is the conspicuous and troubling absence
of a definition of the term "incapacitated" in the code. Even if this
provision is amended to incorporate a more flexible limited-conser-
vatorship system, it stiff will require a determination that the adult is
"so incapacitated that he or she cannot legally give or deny consent ' 453
before the county welfare department can petition the court for a serv-
ices order. The consequences of the decision make subjective deter-
mination of the definition entirely unacceptable. 454 The best definition
of incapacitated involves a full assessment of the elder's functional
as well as mental ability.
4 55
The inquiry into the elder's functional abilities must be objective,
not subjective. The definition of incapacity, therefore, should not in-
clude phrases such as "effectively" or "in his own best interest" when
assessing the elder's functional abilities to manage his own affairs or
direct others to do so. The assessment also must include a determi-
nation that the elder is unable to make or communicate decisions re-
garding his care and that this inability is the result of a demonstrated
disorder or disability. Finally, the definition must incorporate the prin-
ciple of the least restrictive alternative and include some language which
communicates that the incapacitated elder retain all autonomy feasible
in light of the outcome of the above inquiry into the elder's abilities.
The conservatorship imposed must be tailored to the individual, as in
the context of a limited conservatorship in California. Undoubtedly,
a definition of incapacity that incorporates these tenets calls for a la-
borious and time-consuming inquiry. Yet ultimately there should be
no question but that the incapacity inquiry must become a painstaking
attempt to preserve the elder's rights to self-determination.
C. Emergency Intervention Without Consent
Another major gap in the present legislation is the absence of a
defined procedure to be employed in an emergency situation. It first
453. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15650(b) (West Supp. 1990).
454. See supra note 249-252 and accompanying text.
455. See supra note 240.
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should be noted that the establishment of a twenty-four-hour, seven-
day-a-week emergency response system, as recommended by the De-
partment of Social Services in its Report to the legislature, 45 6 is es-
sential to give meaning to any emergency intervention provisions. If
a true emergency situation, one threatening imminent death or great
bodily harm, 457 does not come to the attention of the appropriate au-
thorities within a short time period, the APS worker's assistance may
not be able to avoid the threatened harm. One specifically designated
and well-publicized place must exist where individuals can call at any
time to receive emergency assistance.
Once California has established a statewide twenty-four-hour hot-
line for emergency reporting, the need for a specific procedure for
emergency intervention and provision of services is apparent. The ob-
vious first step is to draft an appropriate definition of "emergency."
The best definition should include some element of imminence or ur-
gency and only should include the likelihood of imminent physical
danger. The problems inherent in employing a definition that requires
an assessment of mental capacity are too great to justify its inclusion.
"Imminent" also should be defined clearly in the statute. The fol-
lowing is an example of an adequate definition of emergency: An
emergency situation is one in which an elder is living in conditions or
is in a situation that presents a substantial risk or likelihood of im-
minent death or imminent serious physical harm to the elder. Im-
minent means that there is a strong probability that death or such
serious physical harm is "ready to take place" within a relatively short
period of time.
In addition to defining emergency, California should implement
a procedure by which APS agencies may petition the courts for an
emergency protective services order. The California provisions should
be modelled after those in other states that allow emergency inter-
vention first and then require that a petition be filed with the court
to validate the continued provision of services. 458 A system that would
require a court order to be issued before the emergency assistance could
be rendered is counterintuitive in a true emergency situation. Once an
APS worker or law enforcement agent, trained in applying the newly
implemented definition of emergency, determines he is confronted with
an emergency situation, the new California emergency procedure would
allow him to take the elder into protective custody. If entry into the
456. See supra notes 377-379 and accompanying text.
457. See supra notes 291-331 and accompanying text.
458. See supra text accompanying notes 322-331.
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elder's home or elsewhere is required, it should be permitted by the
terms of the statute. A procedure that requires a petition for an emer-
gency order to be filed within twenty-four hours after the elder is taken
into emergency custody suffices under emergency circumstances. The
state's interests in protecting its citizens from death or great physical
harm may be permitted to outweigh the elder's interest in self-deter-
mination when the intervention is time-limited and requires court val-
idation within this short time period. Florida's provisions for emergency
intervention are exemplary and serve as a model for a future California
provision.459 They first provide that a petition for an order be filed
within twenty-four hours of the intervention and then stipulate that
a preliminary hearing be held to establish that probable cause exists
to continue the emergency services. 460 If probable cause is shown, a
four-day temporary order may be issued.461 This temporary order may
impose only the least restrictive services necessary to remove the emer-
gency, may include only a change of residence if necessary to remove
the emergency, and may not include removal to a facility for the acutely
mentally ill.462 Upon the expiration of the temporary order, the new
California system would provide that the APS agency could continue
to provide services only under the newly revamped provisions for in-
tervention without consent in nonemergency circumstances.
Conclusion
This Note has illustrated that the current California APS laws
serving victims of elder abuse are ripe for amendment. The existence
of elder abuse, one of our country's most detestable and shameful
problems, is a surprise to many Americans. The magnitude of the
problem and the difficult issues it presents with regard to an elder's
right to self-determination and the state's interest in protecting its eld-
erly citizens as well as the financial difficulties facing the state are
matters that must be addressed and better resolved as we enter the new
century, a century during which the ever-increasing aging population
will and should wield even greater political power. The proposals in
this Note provide a starting point; the rest is up to the California Leg-
islature and Governor Pete Wilson and his veto pen.
459. See FA. STAT. ANN. § 415.105(5)-(6) (West Supp. 1990).
460. Id. § 415.105(b).
461. Id. § 415.105(c)(2).
462. Id. § 415.105(1).
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